市场结构、搜索引擎与竞价排名——以魏则西事件为例

发布时间：2018-05-31 18:17

本文选题：市场结构 + 搜索引擎　；参考：《广东财经大学学报》2017年02期

【摘要】：近年来搜索引擎服务供给市场失灵现象频发,客观上要求对作为搜索引擎主要盈利模式的竞价排名机制进行全新考察。基于SCP范式分析框架和质量酬金拓展模型,从理论上探讨国内搜索引擎市场失灵的内在根源及其解决机制,再结合魏则西事件进行案例验证。研究结果表明:目前国内搜索引擎市场属于典型的寡头垄断市场,服务商通过竞价排名模式对广告主收取高价而获得垄断利润,但广告信息质量却因逆向选择效应而下降,进而造成服务商声誉受损。然而,无论是从短期还是长期来看,声誉租金均不足以激励垄断搜索引擎服务商建立竞价排名中的广告信息甄别机制。为此,政府相关部门应通过财政补贴、税收优惠等手段,合理干预和管控搜索引擎市场,建立有效的市场失灵解决机制。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the market failure of the search engine service supply is frequent. Objectively, it requires a new inspection of the bidding mechanism as the main profit model of the search engine. Based on the SCP paradigm analysis framework and the quality compensation expansion model, the internal root and solution mechanism of the market failure of the domestic search engine are theoretically discussed and the solution mechanism is combined. The case of Wei Zexi's case is verified. The results show that the domestic search engine market is a typical oligopoly market, and the service providers receive high price and monopolize profit through the bidding model, but the quality of the advertising information is reduced because of the adverse selection effect. In the short or long term, the reputation rent is not enough to encourage the monopoly search engine service providers to establish the advertising information screening mechanism in the bidding ranking. Therefore, the relevant government departments should rationally intervene and control the search engine market through financial subsidies and tax incentives, and establish an effective market failure mechanism.
【作者单位】：南京大学商学院;南京财经大学现代服务业研究院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目(15BJY023)
【分类号】：F49

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