互联网创业公司的用户补贴与烧钱:盲目竞争还是理性选择

发布时间：2018-06-27 05:15

本文选题：互联网创业 + 用户补贴　；参考：《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》2017年07期

【摘要】：近年来,我国互联网创业公司依靠大规模融资并对用户进行补贴的商业模式获得快速发展,但从2016年开始,尽管少数热点领域仍能获得资本青睐,互联网创业的整体形势明显转冷。本文在适应性预期假设下构造了一个两期的直接网络外部性模型:各创业公司的产品互不兼容,均在第一期以伯川德竞争的形式对用户进行补贴,在第二期取消补贴,进行差异产品竞争,依靠跨过临界容量后的正反馈过程获取更多用户。研究结果表明:由于其技术特点,互联网产品具有对较大规模用户进行补贴的理性需求,但过度"烧钱"现象主要是由于部分创业公司为寻求垄断,而盲目提高对单个用户的补贴金额所致,这种行为导致的热点领域与整体创业形势的分化无论从社会福利、风险控制还是产业转型的角度都具有一定危害性,需要政府进行规制。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's Internet startups have enjoyed rapid growth in their business models, which rely on large-scale financing and subsidies to users. However, since 2016, although a few hot areas have still gained capital favor, The overall situation of Internet entrepreneurship is obviously turning cold. In this paper, we construct a two-phase direct network externality model under the assumption of adaptive expectation: the products of the startups are incompatible, in the first phase they all subsidize the users in the form of Bertrand competition, and in the second phase, the subsidies are cancelled. Competing for differential products and relying on the positive feedback process after crossing critical capacity to gain more users. The results show that because of its technical characteristics, Internet products have the rational demand to subsidize large scale users, but the phenomenon of excessive "burning money" is mainly due to some startups seeking monopoly. As a result of blindly increasing the subsidy amount to a single user, the differentiation of the hot areas and the overall entrepreneurial situation caused by this behavior is harmful to a certain extent, whether from the perspective of social welfare, risk control or industrial transformation. It needs government regulation.
【作者单位】：南开大学经济与社会发展研究院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD157)
【分类号】：F49

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