基于风险规避的网络广告两阶段收益定价模型
发布时间：2018-08-22 14:23
【摘要】：建立了广告主和广告媒体之间的两阶段收益定价模型,应用纳什讨价还价方法确定了最优的两阶段的定价问题,界定了两阶段定价合同实施的可行性条件,分析了谈判力量与第一阶段定价的关系.研究表明,两阶段定价给予了广告主和广告媒体更为灵活的选择方式.两阶段定价不仅使广告主可以避免较高的广告成本支出,而且能够有效地制止点击欺诈和规避信息不对称性带来的风险,而广告媒体则可以获得额外的收益和吸引更多潜在的广告主,利用数值算例验证了结论的有效性.
[Abstract]:The two-stage revenue pricing model between advertisers and advertising media is established, the optimal two-stage pricing problem is determined by Nash bargaining method, and the feasible conditions for the implementation of two-stage pricing contracts are defined. The relationship between negotiation power and the first stage pricing is analyzed. Research shows that two-stage pricing gives advertisers and advertising media a more flexible choice. Two-stage pricing not only allows advertisers to avoid higher advertising costs, but also effectively prevents click fraud and the risk of information asymmetry. Advertising media can gain additional revenue and attract more potential advertisers. Numerical examples are used to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion.
【作者单位】： 电子科技大学经济与管理学院;十堰职业技术学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070;71101018) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20100185-120024) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(ZYGX2010J126;ZYGX2010J131)
【分类号】：F713.8;F49;F224
[Abstract]:The two-stage revenue pricing model between advertisers and advertising media is established, the optimal two-stage pricing problem is determined by Nash bargaining method, and the feasible conditions for the implementation of two-stage pricing contracts are defined. The relationship between negotiation power and the first stage pricing is analyzed. Research shows that two-stage pricing gives advertisers and advertising media a more flexible choice. Two-stage pricing not only allows advertisers to avoid higher advertising costs, but also effectively prevents click fraud and the risk of information asymmetry. Advertising media can gain additional revenue and attract more potential advertisers. Numerical examples are used to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion.
【作者单位】： 电子科技大学经济与管理学院;十堰职业技术学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070;71101018) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20100185-120024) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(ZYGX2010J126;ZYGX2010J131)
【分类号】：F713.8;F49;F224
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前5条
1 戎文晋;刘树林;;关键词拍卖中最优保留价的研究[J];管理科学学报;2010年04期
2 齐洁,汪定伟;求解网络广告资源优化模型的改进微粒群算法[J];控制与决策;2004年08期
3 周永务;王圣东;;随机需求下单制造商两零售商合作广告协调模型[J];系统工程学报;2011年02期
4 蔡洪文;蔡洪武;张殿业;;零售商主导的联合广告投入共担期权契约模型[J];系统工程学报;2011年03期
5 张娥;汪应洛;;关键字广告位拍卖的收益等价性研究[J];中国管理科学;2006年03期
【共引文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张志华;王莉;;网络环境下广告资源优化决策模型[J];鞍山科技大学学报;2006年05期
2 原全;汪定伟;;关键词拍卖中的投标价格决策[J];东北大学学报(自然科学版);2012年05期
3 王颖;吴e，
本文编号：2197361
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/xxjj/2197361.html
