中国古代官商制度经济绩效——从交易成本到路径依赖

发布时间：2018-01-27 02:57

本文关键词： 官商合一官商勾结交易成本路径依赖经济绩效　出处：《贵州社会科学》2014年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以"盐铁专营"为主要标志的"官商合一"的制度安排是中国古代皇权至上思想在经济领域的体现,由此演变而来的"官商勾结"的非正式制度安排,是在"官商合一"正式制度安排下由商人和地方官吏从个体利益出发,在可供选择方案内最能有效节约交易成本的现实选择。但是,在后期发展中,即便商品经济已然繁荣,"官商勾结"的非正式制度却不仅没有向以商人主导的商业经济转变,反而得到了进一步的强化,这种制度上的路径依赖直接导致了封建社会后期主要"商会"经济随着封建王朝的落寞而崩溃的结果。
[Abstract]:The institutional arrangement of "integration of government and business", which is mainly marked by "salt and iron monopoly", is an informal institutional arrangement of "collusion between government and business", which is embodied in the economic field of imperial power supremacy thought in ancient China. It is the realistic choice which can save the transaction cost most effectively under the formal system of "the combination of official and business" arranged by the businessmen and local officials from the individual interests. However, in the later stage of development, it can save the transaction cost most effectively. Even if the commodity economy has been prosperous, the informal system of "collusion between government and business" has not been transformed into a commercial economy dominated by businessmen, but has been further strengthened. The path dependence of this system led directly to the collapse of the main chamber of commerce in the late feudal society with the desolation of the feudal dynasty.
【作者单位】：北京大学;
【分类号】：F129
【正文快照】： “官商”,是一个时髦的话题,也是一个具有历史渊源和现实意义的主题。这是社会经济中两种最主要身份的结合,是政治领域的经济现象,同时也是经济领域的政治现象。不论任何时期任何国度,官商结合都以不同的具体形式存在并在政治和经济领域发挥着不可估量的作用。在西方,如果没有

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