经济全球化、地方政府行为与国内市场分割

发布时间：2018-07-17 01:25

【摘要】：在中国经济转型的过程中,对外开放无疑是最重要的一项决策之一。少数学者开始从经济全球化的角度对中国国内市场分割进行探索性研究,得出了不尽相同的结论。本文通过构建一个经济全球化背景下地方政府间的动态博弈模型,分析了具有地方保护动机的地方政府是如何博弈从而设置地区间贸易壁垒的,从而对经济全球化、地方政府行为及国内市场分割的关系进行了探讨,最后对如何缓解地方保护行为提供了一些建设性的政策建议。本文对于区际贸易壁垒问题的研究,是基于经济全球化和地方政府行为的双重角度来展开的。首先,本文借鉴了经典关税模型的思想精髓,为了分析经济全球化与国内市场分割的关系,我们在模型中引入了外国地区来刻画经济全球化程度对国内市场分割的影响。其次,我们通过适当的函数来刻画和区分不同类型的地方政府及其行为,分析不同类型地方政府对国内市场分割产生的影响。最后,我们的结论跟现有的文献有一定的差别,经济全球化程度的增大会提高地区间的贸易壁垒系数,但是并不会改变区际最优贸易壁垒,真止降低国内市场分割程度的措施是提高中央惩罚力度和转变地方政府行为。虽然国内有一些文献分别对经济全球化下的国内市场分割或地方政府竞争下的国内市场分割进行了分析,但是国内尚很少有文献能兼顾两者,本文为弥补这方面的空白进行了一个探索性的尝试。就政策建议而言,基于本文的模型分析我们主要提了四点。第一,中央政府要加强法律制度建设,通过加强对市场整合的立法建设和执法力度等途径来加大对地方政府的监管和制约,帮助其跳出“困境”,从法律制度层面上防上地方保护主义的产生和蔓延。第二,中央政府可以利用财政手段对地方政府在市场整合方面所做的努力进行一定奖励或惩罚,从而通过奖“优”罚“劣”来抑制地方保护行为。第三、地方政府要加快政府职能的转变,加强对宏观经济政策的协调、减少对微观经济活动的干预,应充分发挥市场在资源配置中的基础性作用。最后,中央政府要改进对地方政府以GDP为基础的相对绩效评估体系,把地方政府的各种隐性的和显性的地方保护和市场分割行为的削减纳入评估体系,从而促使地方政府从增长型地方政府向民生型地方政府转变。
[Abstract]:In the process of China's economic transformation, opening to the outside world is undoubtedly one of the most important decisions. From the perspective of economic globalization, a few scholars began to explore the domestic market segmentation in China, and drew different conclusions. By constructing a dynamic game model between local governments under the background of economic globalization, this paper analyzes how local governments with local protective motives play games in order to set up inter-regional trade barriers. The relationship between the behavior of local government and the division of domestic market is discussed. Finally, some constructive policy suggestions are provided on how to alleviate the behavior of local protection. The research of interregional barriers to trade is based on the dual angles of economic globalization and local government behavior. In order to analyze the relationship between economic globalization and domestic market segmentation, we introduce foreign regions to describe the influence of the degree of economic globalization on domestic market segmentation in order to analyze the relationship between economic globalization and domestic market segmentation. Secondly, we describe and distinguish different types of local governments and their behaviors through proper functions, and analyze the influence of different types of local governments on domestic market segmentation. Finally, our conclusion is somewhat different from the existing literature. The increasing degree of economic globalization will increase the coefficient of inter-regional trade barriers, but it will not change the optimal inter-regional trade barriers. The measures to reduce the segmentation of the domestic market are to increase the central punishment and change the behavior of the local government. Although some domestic documents have analyzed the domestic market segmentation under the economic globalization or the local government competition respectively, but there are few documents in China that can take both of them into account. This paper makes an exploratory attempt to fill the gap in this area. In terms of policy recommendations, based on the model analysis of this paper, we mainly put forward four points. First, the central government should strengthen the construction of the legal system and strengthen the supervision and restriction of local governments by strengthening the legislative construction and law enforcement of market integration, so as to help them get out of the "dilemma." From the legal system level to prevent the emergence and spread of local protectionism. Second, the central government can use fiscal means to reward or punish local governments for their efforts in market integration, so as to curb the local protection behavior by rewarding "superior" punishment and "bad". Third, local governments should speed up the transformation of government functions, strengthen the coordination of macroeconomic policies, reduce the interference in microeconomic activities, and give full play to the fundamental role of the market in the allocation of resources. Finally, the central government should improve the relative performance evaluation system of local governments based on GDP and incorporate into the evaluation system various implicit and explicit local protection and market segmentation behaviors of local governments. So as to promote the local government from the growth of local government to the people's livelihood of the local government transformation.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F114.41;D630;F723

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