中国地方政府规制行为及其对产业效率的影响研究

发布时间：2018-08-31 17:37

【摘要】：随着中央和地方分权过程以及经济的迅速发展,掌握大量经济资源和行政权力的地方政府表现出滥用规制权力的倾向,实施了许多违背市场规律的行为,典型的表现有：短期行为、税收上的涸泽而渔、过度规制、市场分割、保护落后产业、易被俘获和腐败等等,这些现象对现有的理论提出了挑战。行为经济学、反垄断经济学、政府规制理论以及行政管理学的发展提供了打开政府决策过程的“黑箱”的研究工具。本文利用有关理论和工具搭建了一个地方政府规制行为的分析框架,通过研究地方政府及官员的目标体系、决策行为模式,认识到地方官员有限理性行为人的本性,通过研究规制行为特征,注意到地方政府规制行为的外部性,梳理了地方政府运用行政权力对市场及其竞争关系进行限制或替代的各种行为,分析了政府规制行为影响产业发展的作用机制,测度了政府规制行为对不同产业资源配置的效率影响,提出了地方政府规制改革的思路。全文分为五个部分,第一部分是导论,说明了研究背景,就一些基础概念进行定义和描述,对相关研究文献进行梳理评论。第二部分是2、3、4章,分别从政府目标、多重委托代理和竞争条件下的一般均衡分析三个不同视角研究地方政府的规制行为,重点说明中央与地方关系、地方政府目标体系、地方政府间的竞争如何影响规制行为。第三部分是第5、6章,重点讨论地方政府规制行为的非理性和时间不一致性,对背弃规制承诺、腐败和届际机会主义行为做出了原创性的解释和说明。第四部分是第7、8章,说明了政府规制对产业效率的影响机制和影响效应。第五部分是第9章,分析归纳了规制与产业发展的互动关系,在总结全文的基础上对地方政府规制改革提出了建议。本文在以下方面力求创新：第一,分析了有限理性官员的短视和机会主义。借助行为经济学的视角,放宽了地方政府决策者的理性假设,将地方政府的人格化代表地方官员定位为有限理性的行为人。官员的有限理性来源于不确定性、利己动机和个体理性与集体理性的偏离。地方政府官员实施规制行为时有以下倾向：上级偏好主导、行为短期化、风险规避、机会主义。政府官员作为行为人存在短视偏差,而且由于任期制、考核机制的作用以及官员政治生命周期的特殊性,官员的短视偏差得到强化。通过双曲线贴现模型的推演,研究了政府规制行为为中的时间不一致性,短视偏差的存在使地方政府官员低估远期成本而高估即期收益，，产生非理性行为,在规制政策制定和执行中会进行相机抉择。因届别更替产生的机会主义行为本文定义为届际机会主义。源于行为主体的有限理性和届际间的契约不完备的这种机会主义倾向因政府官员的任期制和政绩考核体制被强化和放大，因缺乏监督机制和代际补偿机制而延续。文章利用叠代博弈模型证明特殊的机会主义是可以消除的实现届际合作关键是有决策者首先做出长远考虑的利他举动,从而在各届间形成稳定的预期，建立和完善互相补偿的惯例的制度就能实现可持续发展第二，研究了地方官员复杂的目标体系与变化的效用。利用共同委托代理理论和多目标决策理论,区分了地方政府目标的差异，从多重委托代理角度研究显示，地方政府的目标体系具有多重性、短期性、冲突性和动态性的特点。区分了中央治国者和地方政府官员的不同效用函数。解释了腐败作为非理性行为产生的原因：短视偏差的存在使官员低估腐败的长期成本，在短期收益的诱惑下容易失去理性，违背初衷走上腐败的不归路。研究了官员的风险偏好、效用函数的结构、腐败惩戒到来的的时间等因素对腐败行为的影响机制。指出单纯提高惩戒力度对防治腐败效果有限。第三,归纳了地方政府规制行为特点及外部性表现。用一般均衡模型分析地方政府间的竞，意识到地区间的禀赋异质性加上地方官员行为决策的个体差异带来不同地区规制方式的不同。,归纳了地方政府规制行为的六个特点：一是规制过度与规制不足共存；二是选择性规制；三是规制政策不连续；四是经济规制分权与社会性规制集权；五是行政垄断表现突出：六是不同层级政府的规制行为偏好不一。地方政府往往通过直接干预或放松社会性规制来影响要还给价格，导致生产成本的非市场化：通过对产业进入退出规制，阻碍技术进步使产业升级非市场化；通过市场的分割导致交易成本增加。注意到部分事业单位同时作为规制机构和市场竞争主体在双重身份下的垄断行为。选择代表性产业效率作为研究对象,对地区垄断势力和行业垄断势力的交织作用和斗争过程进行了描述分析。认识到产业发展对政府规制的反作用，描述了规制变革的产业组织动力。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the central and local decentralization process and the economy, the local governments which have a large number of economic resources and administrative power show a tendency to abuse regulatory power and carry out a lot of violations of the market law. The typical manifestations are: short-term behavior, tax evaporation and fishing, excessive regulation, market segmentation, and protection of backward industries. The development of behavioral economics, anti-monopoly economics, government regulation theory and administrative science provides a "black box" research tool to open up the process of government decision-making. By studying the target system and decision-making behavior model of local government and officials, the paper recognizes the nature of limited rational actors of local officials, studies the characteristics of regulation behavior, notices the externality of regulation behavior of local government, and combs out the restriction or substitution of market and competition relationship by local government using administrative power. This paper analyzes the mechanism of government regulation on industrial development, measures the effect of government regulation on the efficiency of different industrial resources allocation, and puts forward the ideas of local government regulation reform.
The first part is the introduction, which explains the research background, defines and describes some basic concepts, and reviews the relevant research literature. The second part is chapter 2, 3 and 4, which studies the local government regulations from three different perspectives: government objectives, general equilibrium analysis under the conditions of multiple principal-agent and competition. The third part is Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, which focuses on the irrationality and time inconsistency of local government regulation behavior, and makes original explanations and explanations of abandonment of regulatory commitments, corruption and inter-sessional opportunism. The fourth part is Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, explaining the mechanism and effect of government regulation on industrial efficiency. The fifth part is Chapter 9, analyzing and summarizing the interactive relationship between regulation and industrial development, and putting forward suggestions for local government regulation reform on the basis of summarizing the full text.
This article strives to innovate in the following aspects:
Firstly, this paper analyzes the shortsightedness and opportunism of officials with limited rationality. From the perspective of behavioral economics, it relaxes the rational hypothesis of local government decision makers, and locates the local government's personified representatives as the actors with limited rationality. Local government officials have the following tendencies when they implement regulatory actions: superior preferred dominance, short-term behavior, risk aversion, opportunism. Government officials as actors have short-sighted deviation, and because of tenure system, the role of the assessment mechanism and the particularity of the political life cycle of officials, the shortsighted deviation of officials has been strengthened. Through the hyperbolic discount model, this paper studies the time inconsistency in the regulation behavior of the government. The existence of short-sighted deviation causes local government officials to underestimate the long-term cost and overestimate the immediate income, resulting in irrational behavior. In the formulation and implementation of the regulation policy, they will make a camera choice. Intersessional opportunism is defined as intersessional opportunism. This opportunistic tendency originates from the bounded rationality of actors and the incompleteness of inter-sessional contracts. It is strengthened and enlarged by the tenure system and performance appraisal system of government officials, and is continued by the lack of supervision mechanism and inter-generational compensation mechanism. The key to achieving inter-sessional cooperation that can be eliminated is the altruistic act of long-term consideration by policy makers first, so that stable expectations can be formed at all sessions, and sustainable development can be achieved through the establishment and improvement of a system of mutually reinforcing practices.
Secondly, the paper studies the complex target system and the utility of change of local officials. The difference of local government goals is distinguished by using the theory of co-principal-agent and multi-objective decision-making. The research from the angle of multi-principal-agent shows that the target system of local government has the characteristics of multiple, short-term, conflict and dynamic. The different utility functions of statesmen and local government officials explain the reasons why corruption is irrational: the existence of short-sighted bias makes officials underestimate the long-term cost of corruption, easily lose rationality under the temptation of short-term income, and go against the original intention of corruption. It is pointed out that the effect of simply increasing the punishment intensity on preventing and curing corruption is limited.
Thirdly, it summarizes the characteristics and externalities of local government regulation behavior. It uses the general equilibrium model to analyze the competition among local governments, realizes that the heterogeneity of local endowments and the individual differences of local officials'behavior decision-making lead to the different regulation modes in different regions. Excessive and inadequate regulation coexist; second, selective regulation; third, the discontinuity of regulation policy; fourth, the decentralization of economic regulation and the centralization of social regulation; fifth, the prominent manifestation of administrative monopoly; sixth, the regulatory preferences of different levels of government are different. Local governments often influence to be returned through direct intervention or relaxation of social regulation. Price leads to non-market-oriented production costs: through the regulation of industry entry and exit, impeding technological progress to make industrial upgrading non-market-oriented; through market segmentation leads to increased transaction costs. Taking efficiency as the research object, this paper describes and analyzes the interweaving and struggling process of regional monopoly power and industry monopoly power, recognizes the reaction of industrial development to government regulation, and describes the industrial organization motive force of regulation reform.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F123;D630;F124

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