合作微分博弈中的异步非理性行为操纵条件

发布时间：2018-05-31 11:03

本文选题：合作微分博弈 + 非理性行为操纵条件　；参考：《青岛大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：合作是人类社会活动的基础,合作博弈亦成为国际管理科学研究前沿。在动态合作博弈进程中,如果条件允许,局中人可能使用非理性行为来索取额外的收益,而不是执行一开始所达成的合作契约。Yeung(2006)提出了单个局中人的非理性行为操纵条件(IBP),使得在合作机制下,即使在博弈中非理性行为出现,局中人在合作机制下仍然是更好的。Yeung等(2010)提出了联盟的IBP条件,证明了对于污染成本控制模型Shapley值是满足联盟的IBP条件的。对于局中人非理性行为的研究是本文的第一个重点,本文提出了一个全新的条件,使得在博弈中即使非理性行为出现,局中人在合作机制下仍然是更好的。并且更进一步,如果非理性行为出现的越晚,即参与合作的时间越长,那么局中人获得的支付越高,从而可以促使局中人更持久的合作。针对国家之间合作控制污染成本的微分博弈问题,本文提出了该博弈问题的异步非理性行为操纵条件(AIBP),并证明了这个全新的AIBP条件可以促使国家之间更持久的合作。此外,对于两个相邻国家之间合作控制污染成本的微分博弈问题,本文得到了该模型的激励均衡策略和可信性条件,这是论文研究的另一个重点。本文证明了对于污染成本控制博弈提出的线性激励策略并不总是可信的。本文研究了两个国家之间的成本分担问题,设计了沿着时间分担局中人总成本的机制,使得任意时刻局中人在合作下的即时成本低于他的非合作成本。
[Abstract]:Cooperation is the foundation of human social activities, and cooperative game has become the frontier of international management science research. In the dynamic cooperative game process, if conditions permit, people in the game may use irrational behavior to obtain additional benefits. Instead of executing the cooperation agreement reached at the beginning, Yeungn 2006) proposed the manipulation conditions of irrational behavior of the individual bureau, so that under the cooperation mechanism, even in the game of irrational behavior, In this paper, the author puts forward the IBP condition of the alliance, and proves that the Shapley value of the pollution cost control model satisfies the IBP condition of the alliance. The first focus of this paper is the study of irrational behavior of people in the game. A new condition is put forward in this paper, so that even if irrational behavior occurs in the game, the person in the game is still better under the cooperative mechanism. Furthermore, if the irrational behavior appears later, that is, the longer the time to participate in the cooperation, the higher the payoff of the player in the game, which can promote the long-term cooperation of the player in the game. In view of the differential game problem of cooperative pollution cost control between countries, this paper proposes the asynchronous irrational behavior manipulation condition of the game problem, and proves that this new AIBP condition can promote more lasting cooperation between countries. In addition, for the differential game problem of cooperative control of pollution cost between two neighboring countries, this paper obtains the incentive equilibrium strategy and credibility conditions of the model, which is another focus of this paper. This paper proves that the linear incentive strategy proposed for the pollution cost control game is not always credible. In this paper, the problem of cost sharing between two countries is studied, and a mechanism is designed to share the total human cost along the time, so that the real time cost of the person in the bureau is lower than his non-cooperative cost under the cooperation at any time.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：O225

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