凯恩斯概率逻辑思想研究
发布时间:2018-06-01 16:48
本文选题:归纳逻辑 + 概率逻辑 ; 参考:《河北大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:作为英国著名的经济学家、逻辑学家和逻辑贝叶斯主义的代表人物,凯恩斯将古典概率论、数理逻辑同归纳逻辑相结合,创立了逻辑史上第一个概率公理化系统,这也是归纳逻辑这一学科领域的第一个公理化系统。凯恩斯认为,概率一方面是命题与命题之间的具有客观性质的关系,另一方面也是描述在一定的前提下我们对命题持有的合理信念度程度的工具。概率虽然被当作描述合理信念度程度的工具,但是概率只有在少数的特殊情况下才能以数值的方式表示。概率之间是不可以无条件加以比较的,只有两个概率共同满足一系列的条件才能相互比较。凯恩斯通过证实原理反驳了休谟主张的考察事例多寡对归纳结论没有影响的观点。继而通过有限独立变化假说,凯恩斯假定各种各样的事物属性是通过有限的基本属性所衍生而来的,并运用无差别原理解决了归纳前提与归纳结论概率不为0的问题。虽然凯恩斯关于概率客观性的论述及其对归纳问题的解答存在着一些不足,但凯恩斯创立的公理化系统,不仅使得归纳逻辑在系统化方面逐渐缩小了与演绎逻辑的差距,而且还推动了归纳逻辑从古典阶段向现代阶段的演进。同时,凯恩斯借助概率工具对归纳合理性进行论证,也开启了解决归纳问题的新方式。
[Abstract]:As a famous British economist, logician and representative figure of logic Bayesian doctrine, Keynes combined classical probability theory, mathematical logic with inductive logic, and created the first probability axiomatic system in the history of logic. This is also the first axiomatic system in the field of inductive logic. Keynes believed that probability is an objective relationship between propositions and propositions on the one hand and a tool to describe the degree of reasonable belief we hold on propositions on the other hand. Although probability is used as a tool to describe the degree of reasonable belief, it can be expressed numerically only in a few special cases. The probability can not be compared unconditionally. Only if two probabilities meet a series of conditions together can they be compared with each other. Keynes refuted Hume's argument that the number of investigation cases had no influence on the conclusion. Then through the hypothesis of finite independent change Keynes assumed that all kinds of attributes of things were derived from the finite basic attributes and solved the problem that the probability of inductive premise and conclusion was not zero by using the principle of no difference. Although Keynes's argumentation on probability objectivity and his answers to inductive problems have some shortcomings, the axiomatic system established by Keynes not only makes inductive logic narrow the gap between inductive logic and deductive logic in systematization. It also promotes the evolution of inductive logic from classical stage to modern stage. At the same time, Keynes demonstrated inductive rationality by means of probabilistic tools, which also opened a new way to solve inductive problems.
【学位授予单位】:河北大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:O211
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