囚徒困境中基于非均匀连接的促合作控制设计

发布时间：2018-07-27 09:43

【摘要】：本文研究"囚徒困境"中促进合作演化的机制,设计"合作识别"和"背叛识别"两种控制形式,并分析合作在相应控制之下的演化路径问题.在合作识别控制设计中,通过将博弈群体分为合作者子群体和合作者与背叛者共存子群体,形成连接率依赖于个体策略的"非均匀连接",以保护合作的方式抑制背叛,促进合作演化;在背叛识别控制设计中,以惩罚背叛的方式鼓励合作.文章指出,合作识别控制设计能在合作率较低时促进合作,但不能使合作成为演化稳定策略(ESS);背叛识别控制设计能在合作率较高时使合作成为ESS,但是背叛总是该控制下的ESS.结合"合作识别"控制与"背叛识别"控制,本文设计一种切换控制,使得合作是"囚徒困境"博弈的唯一ESS.仿真给出不同要求下的控制律设计,分析不同切换选择对合作演化路径的影响.
[Abstract]:In this paper, we study the mechanism of cooperation evolution in Prisoner's Dilemma, design two control forms of "cooperative identification" and "betrayal recognition", and analyze the evolution path of cooperation under corresponding control. In the design of cooperative identification control, the game group is divided into cooperator subgroup and coexisting subgroup of collaborator and betrayer, which forms "non-uniform connection" which depends on individual strategy to protect and cooperate to restrain betrayal. Promote collaborative evolution; encourage cooperation in betrayal identification control design in a manner that penalizes betrayal. This paper points out that cooperative identification control design can promote cooperation when the cooperation rate is low, but it can not make cooperation become an evolutionary stability strategy. (ESS); betrayal identification control design can make cooperation become (ESS); when the cooperation rate is high, but betrayal is always the one under the control. Combining "cooperative identification" control with "betrayal recognition" control, this paper designs a switching control, which makes cooperation the only ESS of "prisoner's dilemma" game. The design of control law under different requirements is given and the influence of different handoff options on cooperative evolutionary path is analyzed.
【作者单位】：武汉大学系统工程研究所;河南科技学院数学科学学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71231007,71501149)~~
【分类号】：O225

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