政府不同策略下报废汽车正规与非正规回收渠道博弈模型
发布时间：2018-12-09 19:01
【摘要】：为了分析政府不同政策对报废汽车回收渠道的影响,建立了正规回收渠道与非正规回收渠道博弈模型。基于此模型,考虑政府不采取政策、采取对正规回收渠道进行补贴政策及采取对非正规渠道进行监管政策的3种情况。对比分析了3种情况下,政府补贴及监管努力程度对单位回收价格、回收量、利润及环境的影响。研究表明:(1)政府采取补贴政策时,正规渠道与非正规渠道都会提高单位回收价格;政府采取监管政策时,正规渠道降低单位回收价格,非正规渠道提高单位回收价格;(2)政府不同政策对单位回收价格、回收量、利润及环境的影响与政府补贴额、监管努力程度、单位回收价格敏感度系数及监管努力程度系数有关。
[Abstract]:In order to analyze the influence of different government policies on the recycling channels of end-of-life vehicles, a game model between formal and informal recovery channels is established. Based on this model, we consider three situations of government not adopting policy, adopting subsidy policy on formal recovery channel and adopting supervision policy on informal channel. The effects of government subsidy and regulatory efforts on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are analyzed. The results show that: (1) when the government adopts subsidy policy, both the formal channel and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price, and when the government adopts the regulatory policy, the formal channel will reduce the unit recovery price, and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price; (2) the effects of different government policies on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are related to the amount of government subsidy, the degree of regulatory effort, the sensitivity coefficient of unit recovery price and the coefficient of regulatory effort.
【作者单位】： 郑州大学商学院;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;中国大连高级经理学院;
【基金】：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002) 国家重点基础研究发展计划资助项目(2011CB013406) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD147) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301150,71472021)
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.471;F713.2
本文编号：2369878
[Abstract]:In order to analyze the influence of different government policies on the recycling channels of end-of-life vehicles, a game model between formal and informal recovery channels is established. Based on this model, we consider three situations of government not adopting policy, adopting subsidy policy on formal recovery channel and adopting supervision policy on informal channel. The effects of government subsidy and regulatory efforts on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are analyzed. The results show that: (1) when the government adopts subsidy policy, both the formal channel and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price, and when the government adopts the regulatory policy, the formal channel will reduce the unit recovery price, and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price; (2) the effects of different government policies on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are related to the amount of government subsidy, the degree of regulatory effort, the sensitivity coefficient of unit recovery price and the coefficient of regulatory effort.
【作者单位】： 郑州大学商学院;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;中国大连高级经理学院;
【基金】：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002) 国家重点基础研究发展计划资助项目(2011CB013406) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD147) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301150,71472021)
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.471;F713.2
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