《公孙龙子》的语言逻辑和本体论思想研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 05:36

本文选题：公孙龙子　切入点：语言　出处：《北京师范大学》2000年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 本论文以现存《公孙龙子》中的《白马论》、《通变论》、《坚白论》、《指物论》为依据,研究公孙龙的语言逻辑和本体论思想。共分四章。第一章:从现代逻辑学及逻辑哲学的观点出发,对客方反驳“白马非马”说的具体论证中所出现的诸多问题,如,不区分“非白马非马”和“白马非非马”,“有”和“为(是)”、“无”和“非”的混用,从“有白马为有马”到“白马非非马”的推理,从“白马非马”到“马之有色为非马”的类推,不区分“白马非马”和“白马异马”,等等,作了较为详细的分析,认为在当时的一般观念中,专名和类名,个体和个体的类还没有被自觉地区别开来,名称实际上被直接等同于个体。第二章:在第一章的基础上研究公孙龙的“白马非马”说。前分析的常识的观念由于把类和个体直接等同起来的,因而无法解释“白马”和“马”的不同。公孙龙为解决这个矛盾而提出“白马非马”说,其主旨是强调类和个体的不同。但他并没有认识到“白马”也是一个类,而仍把它直接等同于个体,“马”虽被看成是类,但却不是个体的类,而是某种脱离个体而独立存在着的特殊“事物”即“共相”。他论证“白马非马”的思路大体上是这样的:首先,从外延上根据“有马不可谓有白马”断定“白马”和“马”不同。接着又深入到“白马”的内部,从内涵上把“白马”分析为一个合取命题“‘有白’并且‘有马’”,进一步解释“白马”和“马”不同的原因。再把这种内涵上的解释理解为“白马”作为一个个体,其中的“白”和“马”是不可分离的,因此不是作为共相而存在的。第三章:认为“白马非马”(“二无一”),“羊牛而羊而牛”,“青白不相与而相与不相邻而相邻”,“坚白石可二不可三”等说法,实际上是把“白马”看成一个逻辑积,“羊牛”看成一个逻辑和,“青白”则既不是一个纯粹的逻辑和也不是一个纯粹的逻辑积,“坚白石”是“坚石”、“白石”两个逻辑积的逻辑和。第四章:“白马”、“坚石”、“白石”等偏正结构的二字组合(二元逻辑积)在《指物论》中作为一个个体被称为“物”或“物指”,而“坚”、“白”、“马”、“石”等单音节实词则被看成共相而称为“指”。《指物论》就是在本体论的意义上同时确认这样的“物”和“指”的实体地位。
[Abstract]:On the basis of "White Horse Theory", "General change Theory", "firm Whiteness Theory" and "object Theory", this paper studies Gongsun long's linguistic logic and ontological thoughts, which are divided into four chapters. Chapter one: from the point of view of modern logic and logic philosophy, the author argues against the concrete argument of "white horse is not horse", such as, It does not distinguish between "non-white horses" and "white horses", "have" and "do", "none" and "no", and the reasoning from "having a white horse to having a horse" to "a white horse is not a horse", The analogies from "white horse is not horse" to "horse color is non-horse", without distinguishing "white horse from horse" and "white horse different horse", and so on. The author makes a more detailed analysis, and thinks that in the general concept of that time, the proper name and class name are the same. Individual and individual classes have not been consciously distinguished, and the name is actually directly equivalent to the individual. Chapter two: on the basis of the first chapter, the author studies Gongsun long's theory of "white horse and horse". The common sense concept of pre-analysis is based on the direct equivalence between class and individual. Therefore, it is impossible to explain the difference between "white horse" and "horse". In order to solve this contradiction, Gong Sunlong put forward the theory of "white horse is not a horse", the main purpose of which is to emphasize the difference between class and individual. But he did not realize that "white horse" is also a class. And still equating it directly with the individual, "horse" is regarded as a class, but it is not an individual class. It is something that exists independently of the individual, that is, the common. He argues that the white horse is not a horse, and the thinking is generally this: first of all, On the basis of the fact that "there is a horse, there is a white horse", it is concluded that the "white horse" is different from the "horse". Then it goes deep into the interior of the "white horse". The connotation of "white horse" is analyzed as a combined proposition "there is white" and "there is a horse", which further explains the different reasons between "white horse" and "horse", and then it is interpreted as "white horse" as an individual. "White" and "horse" are inseparable, so they do not exist as one. The third chapter thinks that "white horse is not a horse" ("two without one", "sheep and cow but sheep", "green white is not with each other and is not adjacent and adjacent", "Jian Bai Shi can not be three" and so on. In fact, "White Horse" is regarded as a logical product, "Sheep and cattle" as a logical sum. "Qingbai" is neither a pure logic nor a pure logical product. "Jian Bai Shi" is a logical sum of "Jian Shi" and "White Stone". Chapter 4th: "White Horse", "Jian Shi", "White Stone" and so on two word combinations (binary logical product) are called "thing" or "thing meaning" as an individual in the Theory of referring to things, while "Jian", "White", "Horse", "Stone" and so on are monosyllabic and solid. The word is regarded as the same and is called the "finger." the theory of matter is to confirm the entity status of "thing" and "finger" simultaneously in the sense of ontology.
【学位授予单位】：北京师范大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2000
【分类号】：B81-092

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