心理因果问题——从金在权的排他性论证到副现象论
发布时间：2018-12-26 11:00
【摘要】：在非还原物理主义下,金在权用排他性论证说明了目前的非还原物理主义或不令人满意,或不稳固,他推断了其可能的坍塌方向,即副现象论或还原物理主义,但该论证本身又有缺陷,如做修正,则得到四种可能的立场,即还原物理主义,分别预设物理因果封闭律和强物理因果封闭律的两种副现象论,和过决定论。文中的论证指出只有预设强物理因果封闭律的副现象论为可取,且这一立场也能和当今的心理-生理学的经验科学研究相吻合,即心理-行为因果只是大脑为行为提供的解释,而不是真实的,物理的因果关系。
[Abstract]:In the case of non-reductive physicalism, Jin Ze-kuen demonstrated with exclusivity that the current non-reductive physicalism is either unsatisfactory or unstable, and he inferred its possible direction of collapse, namely, para-phenomenology or reductionism. However, the argument itself has its own defects. If it is amended, four possible positions are obtained, namely, reductionism, two para-phenomenological theories of presupposing physical causality closure law and strong physical causality closure law, and over-determinism. The argument in this paper points out that only the para-phenomenon theory of preset strong physical causality closure law is desirable, and this position can also coincide with the empirical research on psychophysiology, that is, psychological-behavioral causality is only an explanation provided by the brain for behavior. And not the real physical causality.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学哲学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目“认知科学对哲学的挑战”(11&ZD187)
【分类号】：B81-0
本文编号：2392030
[Abstract]:In the case of non-reductive physicalism, Jin Ze-kuen demonstrated with exclusivity that the current non-reductive physicalism is either unsatisfactory or unstable, and he inferred its possible direction of collapse, namely, para-phenomenology or reductionism. However, the argument itself has its own defects. If it is amended, four possible positions are obtained, namely, reductionism, two para-phenomenological theories of presupposing physical causality closure law and strong physical causality closure law, and over-determinism. The argument in this paper points out that only the para-phenomenon theory of preset strong physical causality closure law is desirable, and this position can also coincide with the empirical research on psychophysiology, that is, psychological-behavioral causality is only an explanation provided by the brain for behavior. And not the real physical causality.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学哲学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目“认知科学对哲学的挑战”(11&ZD187)
【分类号】：B81-0
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