产权制度与协商民主：河南邓州农村治理模式研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 15:04

本文关键词：产权制度与协商民主：河南邓州农村治理模式研究　出处：《中共中央党校》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：十一届三中全会以来,中国农村土地产权制度变为家庭联产责任承包制,农民获得了承包土地的权利,成为自主经营的个体,农民及农民集体在制度上成为了资源分配的主体。随着农村产权制度的变化,原有的公社体制也随之瓦解,由基层农村自发创造的村民自治被推广到全国。村民自治制度实行三十年来取得了巨大的成就,但是也出现了诸多的乱象和问题,表面上看来是乡村关系的冲突、两委关系的失调、民主选举的乱像,干群关系的恶化等等,但实质是由现有农地产权制度不清晰的产权关系所导致的。国家对农村土地产权界定不清导致诸多问题的产生:政府对土地资源的垄断;村委会由于缺乏监督在处理农民集体土地转让、承包、征地补偿中具有决定权,党支部与村委会会争夺对资源的控制权等等。新制度主义的国家和产权理论认为国家的主要职能就是以强制力为后盾通过对产权制度的界定来实现对资源的分配,而国家目的具有掠夺和契约两重性,即:实现社会总产出最大化和实现垄断租金的最大化;同时制度具有的路径依赖惯性使农村产权制度的不完善得以长期存在。针对村民自治出现的问题,理论界和很多地方政府都进行了积极地研究、探索。河南省邓州市实行的以“4+2工作法”为核心的农村治理模式很好地解决了村民自治中出现的问题,而邓州农村治理模式最大的特点就是将协商民主很好地和村民自治的实践结合起来,改变了村民在现有产权制度和村民自治制度下的不利地位,实现了党的领导、人民当家做主和依法治国的统一。所以,对邓州农村治理模式进行研究可以为更好地完善村民自治制度,实现农村地区更好的发展提供借鉴。本文第一章从产权制度的角度分析了村民自治的兴起和缺陷。认为现有农村产权制度自身的缺陷是村民自治诸多问题产生的根本原因,产权制度和村民自治的缺陷使村民成为有限理性经济人、村委会具有“代理人——当家人”双重角色;党支部面临制度的缺乏与自身的危机;乡镇政府处于领导与指导的冲突。第二章描述了邓州农村治理模式产生的背景;用历史制度主义制度变迁理论从制度环境、行政精英、新观念三个方面分析了邓州农村治理模式的生成过程;认为其解决了现有村民自治制度最大的三个问题:理顺了两委关系、理顺了乡村关系、理顺了干群关系。第三章分析了邓州农村治理模式最核心的特点就是协商民主的制度化。协商民主在邓州农村治理模式中形成了系统化并通过相关的配套制度使其制度化;协商民主改变了农民在现有产权制度下的不利地位、缓解了现有产权制度下村民自治的困境,契合了农村产权制度的内在要求。第四章分析了邓州村民自治模式对村民自治制度发展的启示及应该进一步完善的地方。
[Abstract]:Since the third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, the rural land property rights system Chinese into the household contract responsibility system, farmers get the land contract right, become autonomous individuals, farmers and collective farmers become the main body of the allocation of resources in the system. With the change of rural property rights system, the commune system will collapse, by the grassroots rural villagers' autonomy spontaneous creation has been spread across the country. The implementation of village autonomy in thirty years has made great achievements, but also appeared in many problems, the surface is the conflict of rural relations, imbalance of the relationship between the two committees of democratic elections, like chaos, the deterioration of the relationship between cadres and so on, but the essence is the existing rural land property rights the system is not clear the relationship of property rights caused by national definition of rural land property right is not clear cause so many problems: the government monopoly on land resources of the village; Due to lack of supervision contract in rural collective land transfer, land requisition compensation has the right to decide, the Party branch and the committee will fight for control of resources and so on. The new institutionalism in the state and property rights theory believes that the main function of the state is to force through the definition of property rights system to realize the distribution of resources, and the country has a dual objective plunder and contract, namely: the total social output maximization and realize the maximization of monopoly rents; path dependence and system is not perfect the rural property right system of long-term existence of inertia.
Aiming at the problems of villagers' autonomy, theoretical circles and many local governments have carried out active research and exploration. The implementation of Henan city of Dengzhou province in the "4+2 method" as the core of the rural governance mode is a good solution to the problems appeared in the villagers' autonomy, and the characteristics of rural Governance in Dengzhou is the biggest negotiation practice democracy well and villagers together, change the disadvantageous position of the villagers in the existing property rights system and the villager autonomy system, realize the unified leadership of the party, people are the masters and the rule of law. Therefore, research can better improve the villager autonomy system of governance model of rural Dengzhou, realize the development in rural areas better provide reference.
The first chapter of this paper from the perspective of property rights institution of rise and defects of the villagers' autonomy. That the defects of the existing rural property rights system itself is the fundamental reason of the problems of villagers' autonomy, defect of property right system and the villagers autonomy of villagers as limited rational economic man, the village committee has "agents -- when the family" the dual role of the party; branch faced with the lack of system of township government in crisis; the conflict between leadership and guidance.
The second chapter describes the background of Dengzhou's rural governance mode; with the theory of historical institutionalism system changes in the institutional environment, administrative elite, three aspects of the new concept to analyze the formation process of rural governance in Dengzhou; it solved the three biggest problems existing in village autonomy system: straighten out the relationship between the two committees, straighten out the relationship between the country and straighten out the relationship between cadres.
The third chapter analyzes the characteristics of the core governance model of rural Dengzhou is the institutionalization of the deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy in rural governance in Dengzhou formed a systematic and the related system make it institutionalization of deliberative democracy; change the disadvantageous position of farmers in the existing property rights system, alleviate the existing property rights system of villagers autonomy the dilemma, fit the inherent requirements of rural property rights system.
The fourth chapter analyzes the Enlightenment of the villagers' self-government model to the development of the villager autonomy system and the place that should be further improved in Dengzhou.

【学位授予单位】：中共中央党校
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D422.6

【参考文献】