内部控制信息披露对企业代理成本影响的研究
发布时间:2018-04-28 14:05
本文选题:内部控制信息披露 + 股权代理成本 ; 参考:《集美大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:近年来,企业财务舞弊现象频繁发生,严重的侵害了投资者债权人的利益。内部控制信息的披露可以降低由于信息不对称造成的不利影响,所以内部控制信息披露的规范性受到许多国家的重视。美国、日本等发达国家相继发布了相关法案,规范了内部控制信息披露的范围和深度。为顺应资本市场利益相关者对内部控制信息的强烈需求,2008年我国内部控制标准委员会颁布了《企业内部控制基本规范》和《配套指引》,要求我国沪深两市主板上市公司,应于2012年开始提供内部控制自我评价报告和内部控制审计报告。企业委托代理问题由来已久,内部控制信息作为重要的企业信息,加大其披露力度,可以帮助利益相关者做出投资决策,缓解资本市场的信息不对称问题。新型披露制度下的内部控制信息的披露对企业代理成本有怎样的影响呢?对这一问题的深入研究,有利于拓展内部控制信息披露经济后果研究范围。本文共分为六章内容,基于我国新的内部控制信息披露制度背景下,探索内部控制信息披露对企业代理成本的影响,为企业缓解委托代理问题注入新的活力。本文拓展了前人研究的不足,深入研究内部控制信息及其五要素的披露对企业股权、债权代理成本的影响。一方面内部控制信息披露可以降低信息不对称程度,减少委托人信息搜集成本;另一方面,内部控制信息的反馈,可以帮助企业完善内部控制制度,实现内部制衡,缓解委托代理问题。根据理论分析提出研究假设,选取替代指标进行回归分析,最后得出以下结论:高水平的内部控制信息披露对企业股权代理成本具有显著抑制作用,其中五要素的披露对股权代理成本的影响作用程度不同,企业可以根据自身的情况,将资源合理分配到内部控制制度建设中。由于债权人获取信息的能力强于资本市场的个人投资者,所以内部控制信息的披露对企业债务代理成本的抑制作用不强。进一步结合实际情况,本文提出以下政策建议:1.规范制定部门需进一步完善内部控制信息披露规范标准;2.监督管理部门需要健全内部控制信息披露的监督机制;3.第三方审计应完善企业内部控制审计权责制度;4.企业管理层应提升对内部控制制度建设的重视程度。
[Abstract]:In recent years, corporate financial fraud occurs frequently, which seriously infringes the interests of investors' creditors. The disclosure of internal control information can reduce the adverse effects caused by asymmetric information, so the standardization of internal control information disclosure has been attached great importance to by many countries. The United States, Japan and other developed countries have issued relevant laws to regulate the scope and depth of internal control information disclosure. In order to meet the strong demand of capital market stakeholders for internal control information, in 2008, the Internal Control Standards Committee of our country promulgated the basic norms of Enterprise Internal Control and the supporting guidelines, which required the listed companies on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Internal control self-evaluation reports and internal control audit reports should be available in 2012. The principal-agent problem of enterprises has a long history. As an important enterprise information, internal control information can help stakeholders to make investment decisions and ease the information asymmetry in capital market. How does the disclosure of internal control information under the new disclosure system affect the agency cost of enterprises? The in-depth study on this issue is helpful to expand the scope of economic consequences of internal control information disclosure. This paper is divided into six chapters. Based on the new internal control information disclosure system in China, this paper explores the impact of internal control information disclosure on the agency cost of enterprises, and injects new vitality for enterprises to alleviate the principal-agent problem. This paper extends the shortcomings of previous studies and deeply studies the influence of internal control information and its five elements disclosure on corporate equity and creditor's rights agency cost. On the one hand, the disclosure of internal control information can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and reduce the cost of collecting information from clients; on the other hand, feedback of internal control information can help enterprises improve the internal control system and realize internal checks and balances. Ease the principal-agent problem. According to the theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward the research hypotheses, selects the substitution index to carry on the regression analysis, finally obtains the following conclusion: the high level internal control information disclosure has the remarkable suppression function to the enterprise stock right agency cost. The disclosure of five elements has different influence on the agency cost of equity. Enterprises can allocate resources to the construction of internal control system according to their own situation. Because creditors' ability to obtain information is stronger than that of individual investors in capital market, the disclosure of internal control information does not restrain corporate debt agency cost. Further combined with the actual situation, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations: 1. 1. The standardization department needs to further perfect the standard standard of information disclosure of internal control. Supervision and management departments need to improve the internal control information disclosure supervision mechanism. Third party audit should perfect the audit authority and responsibility system of enterprise internal control. Enterprise management should enhance the degree of attention to the construction of internal control system.
【学位授予单位】:集美大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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