我国房地产上市公司高管薪酬粘性及其有效性的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-25 03:54

本文关键词： 高管薪酬公司绩效薪酬粘性激励　出处：《浙江财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代企业出现了所有权与控制权的分离，导致所有者与高级管理经营者之间的利益目标发生冲突，公司的管理重点渐渐地从物质资本倾斜于人力资本。合理的薪酬激励机制能提高高级经营者的积极性和工作效率，虔诚地履行相关职责，有效避免一些不良现象如人才流失，短期行为等。近年来，高管薪酬与企业绩效的不对称关系即薪酬的粘性特性，已渐渐引起学者们的广泛关注。所谓高管薪酬粘性就是指当公司业绩上升时，高管薪酬水平大幅上升，而公司业绩下降时，高管薪酬未下降或下降的程度很小，即高管薪酬业绩敏感性不对称。本文从高管薪酬粘性这个视角出发，以深沪上市的房地产公司为研究对象，研究高管薪酬的粘性特征对企业未来业绩的影响，对改善高管薪酬激励效果具有重要意义。本文在相关理论的基础上探讨房地产上市公司高管薪酬粘性及其有效性问题。首先，从高管薪酬与企业业绩关系、成本粘性和薪酬粘性以及高管薪酬的影响因素三个方面对国内外研究现状进行回顾和评述。其次，对委托代理理论与信息经济学、人力资本理论和薪酬激励理论进行回顾。最后，以2009-2012年深沪A股房地产上市公司为研究对象，分析房地产上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的关系，对薪酬业绩关系和粘性问题进行回归检验，在此基础之上分析该种粘性对未来业绩的影响。本文采取滞后一期的数据，对薪酬业绩进行了稳健性检验，，以保证研究结果的可靠性和准确性。结合理论分析和实证研究结果，本文分析结论如下：（1）2009-2012年，采用扣除非经常性损益后的净利润DNP作为绩效衡量指标，结果显示我国房地产上市公司高管薪酬与当年业绩之间存在强正相关关系。（2）我国房地产上市公司高管的薪酬存在明显的不对称特征，业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度显著低于业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度，即存在粘性。相较业绩下降时高管薪酬下降的幅度，业绩上升时薪酬的增长幅度是其3.51倍。（3）我国房地产上市公司的高管薪酬粘性与公司的未来业绩成负相关关系，对高管没有起到激励作用。（4）在职消费有助于增强高管薪酬粘性。（5）对所有制类型不同的企业进行分别回归，发现国有企业较非国有企业高管薪酬与业绩具有更强的相关性，且国有企业存在显著高管薪酬粘性，而非国有企业不存在粘性现象。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises leads to conflicts of interests between owners and senior managers. The management focus of the company is gradually tilted from material capital to human capital. Reasonable salary incentive mechanism can improve the enthusiasm and work efficiency of senior managers and perform the related duties devoutly. In recent years, the asymmetric relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, the viscous characteristics of compensation, is an effective way to avoid some undesirable phenomena such as brain drain, short-term behavior and so on. The so-called executive pay stickiness means that when the company's performance rises, the executive compensation level rises significantly, and when the company's performance falls, the executive pay does not fall or fall to a very small extent. From the perspective of executive pay stickiness, this paper takes real estate companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai as the research object to study the impact of the viscous characteristics of executive compensation on the future performance of enterprises. It is of great significance to improve the incentive effect of executive compensation. On the basis of relevant theories, this paper discusses the stickiness and effectiveness of executive compensation in real estate listed companies. Firstly, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is discussed. The cost stickiness and salary stickiness as well as the influencing factors of executive compensation are reviewed and reviewed. Secondly, the principal-agent theory and information economics are discussed. Human capital theory and compensation incentive theory are reviewed. Finally, the real estate listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2009-2012 are taken as the research object. This paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in real estate listed companies, and tests the relationship between compensation performance and viscosity. Based on the analysis of the influence of the stickiness on the future performance this paper adopts the lag data to test the salary performance to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the research results. Combined with theoretical analysis and empirical research results, the conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) in 2009-2012, the net profit (DNP) after deducting non-recurrent gains and losses is used as the performance measure. The results show that there is a strong positive correlation between executive compensation and current performance of listed real estate companies in China. The decrease of salary when the performance drops is significantly lower than the increase of the salary when the performance rises, that is, there is stickiness. Compared with the decline of the executive pay when the performance drops. The increase range of compensation is 3.51 times when performance rises.) the stickiness of executive compensation of listed real estate companies in China is negatively related to the future performance of the company. On the executive does not play an incentive role. 4) on the job consumption helps to enhance the executive pay stickiness. 5) to the different ownership type enterprise carries on the regression separately. It is found that there is a stronger correlation between executive compensation and performance in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises, and there is significant stickiness in executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, but not in non-state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F299.233.4

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