基于利益相关者动态博弈的绿色建筑推进机制

发布时间：2018-03-17 07:12

本文选题：利益相关者　切入点：动态博弈　出处：《土木工程与管理学报》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为解决绿色建筑的推进机制问题,本文通过对绿色建筑发展路径的目标效率分析,将绿色建筑的发展阶段分为起步、发展、成熟三个阶段。运用绿色建筑供需主要相关利益群体进行演化博弈分析,构建绿色建筑供给侧与需求侧的动态博弈模型,分析政府与供需双方的动态演化过程,并提出对应的政策建议。研究表明:在绿色建筑起步阶段,政府应对绿色建筑开发商给予补贴,对传统房地产商实行高税收的政策,促使传统房地产商转型升级;在发展阶段,政府在补贴绿色建筑市场供需双方的前提下,可以对房地产商进行减税以化解过剩库存;在推进成熟阶段,要发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用,以实现博弈三方利益共赢的绿色建筑可持续发展。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problem of promoting mechanism of green building, this paper analyzes the target efficiency of green building development path, and divides the development stage of green building into starting and developing. Three stages of maturity. Using the evolution game analysis of the main relevant interest groups of green building supply and demand, the dynamic game model of supply side and demand side of green building is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process between government and supply side is analyzed. The research shows that in the initial stage of green building, the government should subsidize the green building developers, implement the high tax policy to the traditional real estate developers, and promote the transformation and upgrading of the traditional real estate developers. On the premise of subsidizing both supply and demand in the green building market, the government can reduce taxes on real estate developers in order to defuse excess stocks. In the process of promoting maturity, it is necessary to give play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources. To realize the sustainable development of green building with the benefit of game.
【作者单位】：江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学青年基金(71301065) 国家社会科学基金(16BGL081) 江西省研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2015-S218)
【分类号】：F224.32;F299.233.42

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