中国省级政府间土地出让竞争问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 18:00

本文选题：土地出让竞争 + 工业用地　；参考：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：自我国实行改革开放以来,工业化进一步发展,城市化也开始起步；与此同时,对土地的需求也不断攀升,各地的土地出让规模发展极为迅速。出于多种原因,地方政府之间出现了针对土地出让的竞争行为,可能导致一系列问题的产生。其中,地方政府如何受到其他竞争性政府的影响,如何产生策略性互动行为,这一点值得予以关注和研究。此外,我国在土地出让的实际操作中存在着截然不同的出让方式——协议出让和“招拍挂”。在两种出让方式下,土地出让金的差别非常大。前者主要适用于工业用地,后者主要适用于商业、居住用地。地方政府针对这两种土地出让的竞争行为也会产生区别。本文基于这一出发点,严格区分了工业用地和居住用地两种类型,分别研究地方政府针对这两种土地出让的策略性互动行为。由于目前关于地方政府土地出让竞争的文献研究多数不曾区分土地种类,而且尚未从策略性互动的角度解释地方政府土地出让竞争行为,因此本文的研究具有其现实和理论意义。笔者先对土地出让制度进行了一个梳理,然后通过阐述土地财政问题的内涵和外延以及分析不同土地出让方式下土地财政产生的原因,对引起土地出让竞争现象的土地财政问题进行了一个浅议。理论分析的最后是对不同类型土地出让竞争下的策略互动反应做了一个定性的阐释和分析。在实证分析部分,笔者对理论分析所得出的策略互动反应结果进行了验证,得出结论为：工业用地出让竞争最终会导致“竞次”的结果；而居住用地出让的策略互动结果比较模糊,居住用地出让行为同时受到房地产市场景气程度的显著正向影响。在理论分析和实证检验的基础上,笔者得到了硬化土地出让金预算约束、将土地出让和征用逐步市场化、利用房地产税加强调控房地产市场以及合理地方政府收支等启示。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of reform and opening up in China, industrialization has further developed, urbanization has also begun to start; at the same time, the demand for land has been rising, and the scale of land transfer has developed very rapidly. For a variety of reasons, competition among local governments for land sales may lead to a series of problems. Among them, how the local government is influenced by other competitive governments and how to produce strategic interaction is worthy of attention and study. In addition, there are quite different ways to transfer land in our country-agreement and auction. In the two ways of transfer, the land transfer fee is very different. The former mainly applies to industrial land, the latter mainly applies to commercial and residential land. Competition between local governments for these two types of land sales will also make a difference. Based on this starting point, this paper strictly distinguishes two types of industrial land and residential land, and studies the strategic interactive behavior of local government to these two kinds of land transfer. Because most of the literature on the competition of local government land transfer has not distinguished the land types, and has not explained the competition behavior of local government land transfer from the angle of strategic interaction. Therefore, the study of this paper has its practical and theoretical significance. The author firstly combs the land transfer system, and then analyzes the causes of the land finance under different land transfer modes by expounding the connotation and extension of the land finance problem. This paper makes a brief discussion on the land finance problem which causes the competition of land transfer. The last part of the theoretical analysis is a qualitative explanation and analysis of the strategic interaction under different types of land transfer competition. In the part of empirical analysis, the author verifies the result of strategic interaction in the theoretical analysis, and concludes that: the competition of industrial land transfer will eventually lead to the result of "competition"; However, the interactive results of residential land transfer strategy are vague, and the residential land transfer behavior is significantly positively affected by the prosperity of real estate market at the same time. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the author obtains the enlightenment such as hardening the budget constraint of land transfer, gradually marketization of land transfer and requisition, strengthening the regulation of real estate market by using real estate tax, and reasonable local government income and expenditure.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F301.2

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