效率与民生双目标下国企经营者激励机制与绩效研究

发布时间：2018-06-01 15:13

本文选题：国有企业 + 激励机制　；参考：《福州大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国自1992年开启经济体制改革以来,以加入世贸组织、国企改革和房地产改革等为标志性事件的一系列市场化改革,为中国经济最近十年的繁荣奠定了坚实的基础。然而,当以扩大企业自主权和增加利润留成为核心的国企改革所产生的唾手可得的改革红利逐渐被采摘殆尽的时候,我们不得不开始反思原有的GDP挂帅、单一效率导向的发展模式是否已经走到了尽头。我国的国有企业改革应当朝着两个主要的目标推进；一是效率目标,即改善市场结构,完善市场体制,使更具竞争力和效率,使市场更加透明、公平、有效；二是民生目标,即如何使国有企业在盈利之外承担更广泛的社会责任,使国有资本更好地惠及国民。国有企业先后经历了扩大企业自主权、从经营权向所有权过渡、推进建立现代企业制度和深化国家控股股份公司(特别是上市公司)内部改革等四个阶段。过去二十年间,以单一效率目标为主导的国有企业产权式改革片面强调经济效益,忽视了社会主义制度下的国有企业应该承担的社会责任。当国有企业的市场化改革走进新阶段,如何使国有企业在盈利之外承担广泛的社会责任成为政府监管者考虑的新议题。前期以扩大企业自主权和提高利润分成为核心的国企市场化改革,已经逐渐把相当部分的资产使用权和控制权从政府转移给国有企业,特别是国企的经营者。本论文首先列出了目前效率目标下国企内部针对经营者存在的代理人问题,包括道德风险、逆向选择、内部人控制等,然后在国有企业被赋予追求效率和保障民生两个目标的前提下运用激励理论下的道德风险模型研究如何对国企经营者实施合适的激励水平。针对经济效益和社会效益之间存在的辩证关系,本文分别在互替和互补两种情形下探讨了激励国企经营者追求经济效益和社会效益的次优成本,认为政府作为理性的委托人,在实际操作中会针对各国有企业面临的不同情形在激励成本与总收益(既包括经济效益和社会效益)之间做出比较,然后决定国企经营者的激励水平。随后我们通过选取合适的经济绩效指标和社会绩效指标对国企经营者的激励水平进行实证分析,结果显示一项综合反映经济绩效和社会绩效的指标,每股社会贡献值可以很好的解释行业内国企经营者薪酬分布。最后,本文在以上模型推导和实证分析的基础上,针对改善国企经营者激励机制提出了制度性建议。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of China's economic system began in 1992, a series of market-oriented reforms, such as China's accession to the WTO, the reform of state-owned enterprises and the reform of real estate, have laid a solid foundation for the prosperity of China's economy in the past ten years. However, as the easy dividend from the SOE reform, which focuses on expanding corporate autonomy and increasing profit retention, is gradually being harvested, we have to begin to rethink the old GDP. Whether the single efficiency-oriented development model has come to an end. The reform of state-owned enterprises in China should be advanced towards two main objectives: one is to improve the market structure, to perfect the market system, to make the market more competitive and efficient, and to make the market more transparent, fair and effective; and the second is the goal of people's livelihood. That is, how to make state-owned enterprises bear more social responsibility beyond profit, so that state-owned capital can benefit the people better. State-owned enterprises have experienced four stages: enlarging the autonomy of enterprises, transforming from management right to ownership, promoting the establishment of modern enterprise system and deepening the internal reform of state-controlled joint-stock companies (especially listed companies). In the past two decades, the property right reform of state-owned enterprises, which is dominated by a single goal of efficiency, has emphasized the economic benefits one-sidedly, and neglected the social responsibility of the state-owned enterprises under the socialist system. When the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises enters a new stage, how to make state-owned enterprises bear extensive social responsibility in addition to profits has become a new issue for government regulators to consider. In the early stage, the state-owned enterprises, whose core is to expand their autonomy and improve their profits, have gradually transferred a considerable part of the right to use and control of assets from the government to the state-owned enterprises, especially the managers of state-owned enterprises. This paper first lists the agent problems in state-owned enterprises for managers under the current efficiency target, including moral hazard, adverse selection, insider control and so on. Then on the premise that state-owned enterprises are endowed with the two goals of pursuing efficiency and safeguarding people's livelihood, the moral hazard model based on incentive theory is used to study how to implement the appropriate incentive level for state-owned enterprise managers. In view of the dialectical relationship between economic and social benefits, this paper discusses the suboptimal cost of encouraging SOE operators to pursue economic and social benefits under the circumstances of mutual substitution and complementarity, and thinks that the government is the rational client. In practice, the incentive cost and total income (including economic and social benefits) will be compared according to the different situations faced by state-owned enterprises, and then the incentive level of state-owned enterprise managers will be determined. Then we choose appropriate economic performance indicators and social performance indicators to analyze the incentive level of state-owned enterprise managers, the results show that a comprehensive reflection of economic performance and social performance indicators. Social contribution per share can explain the salary distribution of SOE operators in the industry. Finally, based on the above model derivation and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some institutional suggestions to improve the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers.
【学位授予单位】：福州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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