纵向分权、横向竞争与土地价格扭曲

发布时间：2018-06-03 01:10

本文选题：财政分权 + 晋升激励　；参考：《浙江工商大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：地价快速上涨和土地财政一直是经济社会的热点问题,然而对土地市场的结构性扭曲及其作用机理还缺少足够的关注和研究。本文从商住用地和工业用地的相对价格入手,逻辑推导分税制改革后财政分权体系驱使地方政府扩大对预算外收入的攫取,土地财政由此应运而生；而同时以经济增长为主要政绩考核指标的政治晋升制度激励地方官员对于外商投资的激烈争夺,纵向财政分权和横向晋升竞争的双重压力导致了土地价格扭曲的形成。本文在理论分析的基础上,利用2004-2010年中国35个主要大中城市的数据,考察不同类型土地与纵向分权和横向竞争的交错作用机理。研究结果表明：第一,财政缺口和引资竞争均对不同类型用地价格扭曲存在显著影响,并且财政缺口中约30%是由引资竞争引致的。 (一)财政分权和晋升竞争指标的系数在不同变量组合的模型中均显著为正,说明财政分权和晋升竞争都会加剧当地土地价格扭曲的程度。 (二)在引入财政分权和晋升激励的交互项后我们发现,交互项的系数为正,这表明晋升激励确实通过财政分权产生了作用,地方政府间的晋升竞争越激烈,财政分权对土地价格扭曲的影响越大。同时,在控制了财政分权与晋升激励的交互项后,财政分权指标的系数下降了大约30%,这说明在土地财政名义下产生的地价扭曲,30%左右并非源于土地财政本身,而是由于地方晋升激励间接产生的,即以低价出让工业用地作为重要引资手段的晋升竞争,会导致地方政府通过进一步抬高商住用地的价格来弥补其中的机会成本,从而加剧分权对地价扭曲的影响程度。由此表明,除了现行的分税制财政政策以外,地方政府间的晋升竞争也是导致各地土地财政进而引起房价持续上涨的重要因素之一。第二,限制土地供给对工业用地影响非常小,供给约束主要通过财政分权渠道抬高商住用地价格。土地出让面积对于地价扭曲的影响显著为负。此外,我们还可以发现,土地出让面积约束,对晋升激励的影响很小,但是对财政分权的影响较大,这说明无论用地规模如何限制,地方政府的行动逻辑是首先保证满足工业项目用地要求,然后从商住用地上找回收支缺口。这从另一个侧面证实土地约束主要是推高商住用地价格,其作用途径主要是通过财政分权渠道实现的。第三,财政分权对于地价扭曲在一线城市有着正向的影响,主要是因为其财政收支缺口的压力及天然的区位优势所造成高商住用地价格所致；财政分权对地价扭曲在二线城市有着负的影响,主要是由于其地方政府对于经济增长的过度追求所导致的工业地价被压低而形成；财政分权对于地价扭曲的影响由于政府转移支付的存在和本身房地产市场的落后而在三线城市表现不明显。
[Abstract]:The rapid rise of land price and land finance have been hot issues in economic society. However, the structural distortion of land market and its mechanism of action are still lack of enough attention and research. Starting with the relative price of commercial and residential land and industrial land, this paper deduces logically that the fiscal decentralization system after the reform of the tax sharing system drives the local government to expand the grab of the extra-budgetary income, thus the land finance emerges as the times require; At the same time, the political promotion system, which takes economic growth as the main performance evaluation index, encourages local officials to compete for foreign investment, and the double pressure of vertical fiscal decentralization and horizontal promotion competition leads to the formation of land price distortion. On the basis of theoretical analysis, using the data of 35 major cities in China from 2004 to 2010, this paper investigates the staggered mechanism between different types of land and vertical decentralization and horizontal competition. The results show that: Firstly, the financial gap and the competition for attracting capital have significant effects on the price distortion of different types of land, and about 30% of the gap is caused by the competition of attracting capital. (1) the coefficients of the index of fiscal decentralization and promotion competition are significantly positive in the models of different variable combinations, indicating that both fiscal decentralization and promotion competition will aggravate the distortion of local land prices. (2) after introducing the interactive term of fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive, we find that the coefficient of the interactive term is positive, which indicates that promotion incentive does work through fiscal decentralization, and the competition for promotion among local governments is more intense. The greater the impact of fiscal decentralization on land price distortions. At the same time, after controlling the interaction between fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization index has decreased by about 30%, which shows that the distortion of land price under the name of land finance does not originate from the land finance itself. But because of local promotion incentive indirectly, that is to say, the promotion competition of selling industrial land at a low price as an important means of attracting investment will lead local governments to make up for the opportunity cost by further raising the price of commercial and residential land. Thus exacerbating the influence of decentralization on the distortion of land price. In addition to the current fiscal policy of tax sharing, the promotion competition among local governments is also one of the important factors that lead to the land finance in various places and then cause the house prices to rise continuously. Second, limiting land supply has little effect on industrial land, and supply constraints mainly raise commercial and residential land prices through fiscal decentralization channels. The effect of land transfer area on land price distortion is significantly negative. In addition, we can also find that the impact of land transfer area constraints on promotion incentives is very small, but the impact on fiscal decentralization is greater, which shows that no matter how limited the scale of land use, The logic of local government action is to ensure that the land requirements of industrial projects are met first, and then to recover the gap of income and expenditure from commercial and residential land. This proves from the other side that the land constraint is mainly to push up the price of commercial and residential land, and its function is mainly realized through the channel of fiscal decentralization. Third, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on the distortion of land price in first-tier cities, mainly because of the pressure of the gap of revenue and expenditure and the high price of commercial and residential land caused by the natural location advantage. Fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on the distortion of land price in the second tier cities, mainly because the local governments' excessive pursuit of economic growth led to the depression of industrial land prices. The effect of fiscal decentralization on the distortion of land price is not obvious in the third tier city because of the existence of government transfer payment and the backwardness of its own real estate market.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F301.4;F812.2;D630

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