管理者过度自信对我国上市公司融资决策影响的实证研究
发布时间：2018-07-18 07:48
【摘要】：自从著名的MM定理由Modigliani和Miller提出以来，公司的融资决策一直是国内外学者关注的焦点问题。人们通过很多理论来试图解释公司的融资决策，但其中绝大多数的研究都停留在假定管理者和投资者是效用最大化的理性决策者。近几年随着公司行为融资研究的不断发展与深入，西方学者们将公司融资决策主体的行为研究与行为金融的基本假设和研究方法结合起来，从高管人员行为特质这个角度对公司融资决策研究进行补充与完善。目前，学者们已经认识到管理者非理性对公司融资决策有着重要的影响尤其是过度自信的认知偏差，对于这个方面的研究已经是形成了一种潮流。管理者过度自信与公司融资决策的研究，西方发达国家较为领先，研究成果也相对较多，相比之下在中国制度背景下，类似的研究相对匮乏。因此本文假设管理者是非理性人，着重从管理者过度自信的角度进行分析研究，希望能够丰富该领域的研究成果，并为公司管理实践提供有益的借鉴。 本文试图研究以下问题：如何度量管理者过度自信？过度自信的认知偏差是否也存在于中国上市公司管理者当中？管理者的过度自信是否会影响公司的融资行为？ 本文首先总结了国内外学者的相关研究并且对其研究进行了梳理，在此基础上，提出本文的研究视角。然后本文从行为融资角度出发，，从两个方面对管理者过度自信程度进行定义与衡量，首先是利用管理者持股数量的变化，第二是利用了高管薪酬的相对比例，本文选取的研究样本主要是2009-2011年沪深证券交易所A股上市的上市公司数据（剔除了金融类、房地产类上市公司，资产负债率大于100%的公司以及数据缺失的公司），主要研究了上市公司资本结构以及债务期限结构与管理者过度自信的相关关系。实证结果显示公司资本结构与债务期限结构受管理者过度自信的影响是十分显著的。研究结果表明：过度自信的管理者通常会高估公司对未来投资所获得的收益，进而股东对于融资的判断也会受到这种盲目乐观行为的影响，这就导致新老股东们对于公司未来的收益的分配产生矛盾，老股东通常不愿与新股东分享收益，因而通过进行债务融资而不是股票融资更加符合他们的心理，这样一来，过度自信的管理者由于自身的决策会使得公司呈现出较高的债务水平；同时，存在过度自信心理偏差的管理者往往会倾向于进行更多的短期债务融资，一方面是由于他们往往高估了自己的经营能力，另一方面他们相信投资收益比项目投资的实际收益要高，投资回收期要更短。
[Abstract]:Since the famous MM reason Modigliani and Miller put forward, the financing decision of the company has always been the focus of attention of domestic and foreign scholars. People try to explain the financing decision of the company through many theories, but most of the studies remain on the assumption that managers and investors are rational decision makers of utility maximization. In recent years, with the continuous development and deepening of the research on corporate behavioral financing, western scholars combine the behavioral research of corporate financing decision makers with the basic assumptions and research methods of behavioral finance. From the perspective of executives' behavioral characteristics, the research on corporate financing decision is supplemented and perfected. At present, scholars have realized that irrational managers have an important impact on corporate financing decisions, especially the cognitive bias of overconfidence. The research on this aspect has formed a trend. The research on manager overconfidence and corporate financing decision is more advanced in western developed countries, and the research results are relatively more. In contrast, under the background of Chinese system, similar studies are relatively scarce. Therefore, this paper assumes that managers are irrational people, and focuses on the analysis and research from the perspective of managers' overconfidence, hoping to enrich the research results in this field and provide useful reference for the practice of corporate management. This paper attempts to study the following questions: how to measure managers' overconfidence? Is the cognitive bias of overconfidence also present among managers of listed companies in China? Will the overconfidence of managers affect the financing behavior of the company? This paper first summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars' related research and combs its research, on this basis, puts forward the research angle of this paper. Then, from the perspective of behavioral financing, this paper defines and measures the degree of manager overconfidence from two aspects: firstly, using the change of the number of managers' shareholding, and secondly, using the relative proportion of executive compensation. The research sample selected in this paper is mainly the data of A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009-2011 (excluding financial and real estate listed companies. The relationship between capital structure, debt maturity structure and manager overconfidence of listed companies is studied. Empirical results show that corporate capital structure and debt maturity structure are significantly affected by overconfidence of managers. The results show that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the return on future investment, and that shareholders' judgment on financing is also influenced by this blindly optimistic behavior. This leads to contradictions between new and old shareholders about the distribution of the company's future income, and the old shareholders are often reluctant to share the benefits with the new shareholders, so it is more in line with their psychology to finance debt rather than equity. Overconfident managers tend to have higher debt levels because of their own decisions, and managers with overconfidence biases tend to make more short-term debt financing. On the one hand, they often overestimate their ability to operate, on the other hand, they believe that the return on investment is higher than the actual return on the investment of the project, and the payback period of the investment is shorter.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6
本文编号：2131229
[Abstract]:Since the famous MM reason Modigliani and Miller put forward, the financing decision of the company has always been the focus of attention of domestic and foreign scholars. People try to explain the financing decision of the company through many theories, but most of the studies remain on the assumption that managers and investors are rational decision makers of utility maximization. In recent years, with the continuous development and deepening of the research on corporate behavioral financing, western scholars combine the behavioral research of corporate financing decision makers with the basic assumptions and research methods of behavioral finance. From the perspective of executives' behavioral characteristics, the research on corporate financing decision is supplemented and perfected. At present, scholars have realized that irrational managers have an important impact on corporate financing decisions, especially the cognitive bias of overconfidence. The research on this aspect has formed a trend. The research on manager overconfidence and corporate financing decision is more advanced in western developed countries, and the research results are relatively more. In contrast, under the background of Chinese system, similar studies are relatively scarce. Therefore, this paper assumes that managers are irrational people, and focuses on the analysis and research from the perspective of managers' overconfidence, hoping to enrich the research results in this field and provide useful reference for the practice of corporate management. This paper attempts to study the following questions: how to measure managers' overconfidence? Is the cognitive bias of overconfidence also present among managers of listed companies in China? Will the overconfidence of managers affect the financing behavior of the company? This paper first summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars' related research and combs its research, on this basis, puts forward the research angle of this paper. Then, from the perspective of behavioral financing, this paper defines and measures the degree of manager overconfidence from two aspects: firstly, using the change of the number of managers' shareholding, and secondly, using the relative proportion of executive compensation. The research sample selected in this paper is mainly the data of A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009-2011 (excluding financial and real estate listed companies. The relationship between capital structure, debt maturity structure and manager overconfidence of listed companies is studied. Empirical results show that corporate capital structure and debt maturity structure are significantly affected by overconfidence of managers. The results show that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the return on future investment, and that shareholders' judgment on financing is also influenced by this blindly optimistic behavior. This leads to contradictions between new and old shareholders about the distribution of the company's future income, and the old shareholders are often reluctant to share the benefits with the new shareholders, so it is more in line with their psychology to finance debt rather than equity. Overconfident managers tend to have higher debt levels because of their own decisions, and managers with overconfidence biases tend to make more short-term debt financing. On the one hand, they often overestimate their ability to operate, on the other hand, they believe that the return on investment is higher than the actual return on the investment of the project, and the payback period of the investment is shorter.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6
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