内部控制信息披露与真实活动盈余管理关联性研究

发布时间：2018-10-09 18:32

【摘要】：高质量的内部控制信息披露有助于抑制公司内部人操纵财务报告信息、披露虚假财务信息,从而进行盈余管理的行为。目前,由于内部控制信息披露制度的不断完善,单纯依靠传统会计造假方式或操控应计制利润进行盈余管理的方式已经得到一定限制,而不少上市公司高管为了满足其特定的盈余管理需求,愈发倾向于采用更为隐蔽的方式,即真实活动盈余管理来操控利润。但目前国内外针对内部控制信息披露是否能抑制真实活动盈余管理的这一新问题却研究较少。本文将对国内外有关内部控制信息披露与真实活动的盈余管理的研究成果进行总结和归纳,以我国A股上市房地产企业为样本,对其2010-2012年度相关财务数据进行统计整理、回归分析和相关性研究；并将民营企业和国有企业进行分样本研究,比较民营与国有上市公司之间内部控制信息披露对盈余管理监督效果的差异,这也是对内部控制信息披露与真实活动盈余管理关系这一研究问题成果的丰富和补充。本文发现,目前我国上市房地产企业内部控制的重视程度逐年增加,对于内部控制自我评价报告的披露制度已相对完善,但内部控制鉴证报告披露情况仍然不佳。内部控制自我评价报告的披露与真实活动的盈余管理程度显著负相关,能够有效的抑制盈余管理情况的发生；但内部控制鉴证报告与上市房企真实盈余管理水平呈正相关,出现这种情况,本文认为是由于样本公司披露内部控制鉴证报告的数量较少,外部注册会计师提供的鉴证报告并非真实有效,因而无法发挥抑制盈余管理的作用。此外,本文在进行国有和民营上市房企分样本研究时发现,无论是国有还是民营上市房企,其内部控制自我评价报告和鉴证报告对盈余管理的影响都与全样本相同,对内部控制鉴证报告都不够重视,这点在公司的所有制形式方面并没有影响。但国有上市房企的真实活动盈余管理均值远高于私有上市房企,这是由于国有企业代管者没有剩余索取权,使其缺乏监管动机去监督管理层,容易产生内部人控制的问题,管理层就更容易做出有利于自身利益而损害股东利益的决策,继而导致了上市公司真实活动盈余管理程度的增加。最后,根据实证分析结果和针对我国国情,提出相应完善资本市场上市公司内部控制信息披露的政策建议和相关措施。
[Abstract]:The high quality disclosure of internal control information is helpful to restrain the company insiders from manipulating financial report information and disclosing false financial information so as to carry on the behavior of earnings management. At present, due to the continuous improvement of the internal control information disclosure system, the way of earnings management based solely on the traditional accounting fraud or the manipulation of accrual profits has been limited to a certain extent. In order to meet the demand of earnings management, many executives of listed companies are more inclined to adopt a more covert way, that is, real earnings management to control profits. However, there is little research at home and abroad on whether disclosure of internal control information can restrain the earnings management of real activities. This paper will summarize and summarize the research results of internal control information disclosure and earnings management of real activities at home and abroad, take A share listed real estate enterprises as samples, and make statistical analysis on the relevant financial data of China A-share listed real estate enterprises in 2010-2012. Regression analysis and correlation study, and the private enterprises and state-owned enterprises are divided into samples to compare the difference of the effect of internal control information disclosure on earnings management supervision between private and state-owned listed companies. It also enriches and complements the research on the relationship between internal control information disclosure and real earnings management. This paper finds that the degree of attention to the internal control of listed real estate enterprises is increasing year by year, and the disclosure system of internal control self-evaluation report has been relatively perfect, but the disclosure of internal control authentication report is still poor. The disclosure of internal control self-evaluation report has a significant negative correlation with the degree of earnings management of real activities, which can effectively restrain the occurrence of earnings management, but the internal control identification report has a positive correlation with the real earnings management level of listed housing enterprises. In this case, this paper thinks that because the sample companies disclose the number of internal control authentication reports is relatively small, the external certified public accountant provided the authentication report is not true and effective, so it can not play the role of restraining earnings management. In addition, in the study of state-owned and private listed housing enterprises, it is found that both state-owned and private listed housing enterprises have the same impact on earnings management as the internal control self-evaluation report and authentication report. The lack of attention to internal control forensics does not affect the form of ownership of the company. However, the average value of real activity surplus management of state-owned listed housing enterprises is much higher than that of private listed housing enterprises. This is because the escrow of state-owned enterprises does not have the residual claim right, which makes them lack the incentive to supervise the management, so it is easy to have the problem of insider control. It is easier for managers to make decisions that are beneficial to their own interests and harm the interests of shareholders, which leads to an increase in the degree of earnings management in real activities of listed companies. Finally, according to the results of empirical analysis and the situation of our country, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions and relevant measures to improve the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies in the capital market.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275

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