通信产业价值链的运营商与服务提供商、终端商竞合关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-15 21:44

本文选题：电信产业 + 产业价值链　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着通信技术的发展及人们对通信服务内容和质量要求的逐渐提高,数据通信业务已成为推动运营商利润增长的重要动力源,同时它的发展也带来了传统电信产业价值链模式的深刻变化,产业价值链中出现了各种新型的功能主体,如服务提供商(SP)、虚拟运营商、应用集成商等,促使电信产业的分工进一步细化,新型电信产业价值链在扩展原有电信内容的同时,也产生新的细分性的裂变,拥有更多的价值环节和价值内容。随着数据业务的发展,电信产业价值链结构及主体之间的关系越来越复杂,整个价值链也逐渐暴露一些问题：第一,价值主体之间的协调不顺畅。数据业务不断的发展使得越来越多的SP加入到价值链中来,SP要通过运营商的网络平台向用户提供信息、服务,作为使用运营商网络资源的代价,SP必须向运营商支付通信费,另外运营商代SP收取信息费,SP需要向运营商支付一定比例的信息费,双方之间的结算问题成为了双方的矛盾焦点；为了更好的推广自己的数据业务,运营商需要采取终端定制策略,尽管终端定制策略能够解决终端与新业务的兼容性问题,但是运营商面临营销风险及成本补贴压力,同时终端商也面临自身品牌被淡化的风险,如何解决双方的矛盾,需要找到一种合适的激励方案。第二,电信产业价值链上的主体发展不均衡。设备供应商掌握了网络技术标准、终端商拥有技术优势,两者共同引领技术市场的发展；运营商掌握了网络资源,其他各中间服务环节需要利用运营商的网络平台才能向用户提供中间服务,运营商处于价值链的核心地位,电信产业的中间环节则处于相对弱势的地位。为了解决上述电信业存在的问题,必须理顺电信产业价值链上各主体之间的关系。由此确定了本文的研究主题。电信产业价值链发展到3G时代的融合网络结构,电信产业价值链各主体为了保持住自身的优势及利益最大化,将不断的向自身的上下游环节一体化转型。3G时代增值业务市场潜力巨大,并且已经成为了价值链参与主体的重要利润来源。在此情况下,运营商不再满足于自己传统的网络平台提供者的角色,逐步介入其他价值链环节,比如中国移动的移动飞信业务成为运营商一体化转型的典范。运营商转型首先是不再满足于自身的平台提供者的角色,其次必须要在自身网络资源及用户资源优势的基础上实现业务的创新。电信运营商向内容服务环节一体化转型,面对自己战略合作伙伴SP,两者之间又多了一层竞争关系,从而形成竞争合作的复杂关系。运营商向内容服务环节一体化转型,为了推广自己的数据业务,终端的兼容支持显得尤为重要,终端定制成为了运营商策略选择的必然趋势。在终端定制过程中,双方均希望自身利益的最大化,双方之间战略竞合关系指双方在心里上存在竞争关系,是一种利益的竞争心理,在业务上进行合作,双方由此产生竞争合作的委托代理关系。在目前的理论文献的研究中,主要集中在电信产业价值链的构成、价值链模式、价值链发展趋势及价值链上各主体之间的合作策略等方面的研究上,对价值链上各主体之间的竞合关系的研究比较少。本文除了研究价值链纵向主体之间供给的合作关系之外,还对主体之间的利益竞争关系进行研究。本文对电信产业价值链主体的一体化转型趋势进行了分析,由此证明了电信产业价值链主体之间的关系由原来单纯的上下游供给关系变成了你中有我、我中有你的合作竞争关系。在此基础上,分析了价值链各主体合作竞争关系的选择,即以运营商为核心与其他主体形成共生共赢关系。为下文以运营商为核心与SP、终端商之间竞合关系研究奠定基础。运营商与SP之间的复杂关系源于运营商的转型趋势。运营商转型基于以下两点原因：一是运营商自身发展需要及技术、需求与产业价值链主体趋同化竞争的推动；二是增值业务的发展空间巨大客观上刺激了运营商向SP增值业务领域的渗透。运营商转型进入增值业务市场,面对既是合作伙伴又是竞争对手的SP,双方关系微妙和不确定。本文建立了运营商与SP竞争与合作模型。在竞争模型中,指出运营商以推出替代业务介入SP增值业务市场,运营商是市场的追随者,SP是市场的领导者,运营商只能部分分流SP收益,两者达到竞争均衡时,运营商的业务量与收益均小于SP。在合作模型中,借鉴Stackelberg模型在供应链中收入共享合同方面的应用,分别建立了各自利益最大化及整体利益最大化的合作模型。对模型进行求解,得到当其他条件不变,信息服务费价格、信息收入分成比例以及双方利润与市场需求量正相关,与价格弹性系数负相关,在整体利益最大化模型下的合作能够实现合作双方利益的帕累托改进。应用中国移动与腾讯的竞争合作案例做了实证分析。运营商为了发展自己的增值业务采取终端定制策略,终端商的努力水平不能够被运营商观察到,双方存在委托代理关系。根据终端业务定制的深浅程度,运营商与终端的委托代理关系也存在差别,为了研究的简便,本文研究运营商采取浅层终端定制策略下双方的委托代理模型。在运营商采取浅层终端定制策略下的委托代理模型中确定了运营商对终端厂商的最佳激励强度及其影响因素,因此运营商应该给予终端厂商适当的激励强度。最后应用中国移动的终端定制的案例进行了实证研究本文具体章节构成如下：第一章为绪论部分。首先分析了本文的研究背景及意义,将电信产业价值链发展过程中存在的问题归结为一个根源性问题：电信产业价值链的各主体发展不均衡、各主体之间协调不顺畅等问题而导致整体价值创造效率低下。据此提出研究电信产业价值链各主体合作竞争关系予以解决,然后扼要介绍了本文的研究内容及解决的关键问题,明确本文的研究方法。第二章为相关理论基础及文献综述。介绍了本文应用的理论基础及文献综述,主要包括博弈论与委托代理理论,产业链融合一体化理论等,并对电信产业价值链的国内外研究现状进行了综述,总结了理论研究的不足。第三章为电信产业价值链构成、演进与国内外现状对比分析。介绍了电信产业价值链的构成、演进历程及影响因素,并对比分析了国内外电信产业价值链模式。第四章分析了电信产业价值主体一体化转型趋势及各主体合作竞争关系选择模式。通过对电信产业价值链各主体向其他价值环节一体化转型的研究,确定各主体之间由原来单纯的上下游供给关系转变为合作竞争关系。并且以运营商为例从理论和实际两方面分析其转型的原因及转型的方向。在明确了价值主体之间存在合作竞争关系的情况下,借鉴现有文献的研究成果,将电信产业比作生态系统,并指出在电信产业生态系统中存在关键种——电信运营商,电信产业各主体之间的关系是以运营商为核心与其他价值主体之间形成合作共赢的关系。从而为下文以运营商为核心与SP、终端商之间的竞合关系研究奠定基础。第五章主要运用Stackelberg模型理论,以电信产业价值链的主体——电信运营商与SP之间关系为对象,研究了两者的合作竞争关系；应用委托代理理论分析了电信产业价值链的主体——电信运营商与终端厂商之间合作竞争的委托代理关系。运用博弈论建立运营商与SP的竞争与合作模型,分析了运营商对SP的分流比例以及双方合作的分成系数,并结合实际案例验证了理论模型的合理性。在运营商与终端商关系研究中,分析了终端定制中的委托代理关系,针对运营商采取浅层终端定制策略建立运营商对终端商激励的委托代理模型,计算了运营商对终端商的激励强度,并结合实际案例论证了理论分析。第六章为结论与启示。对本文的主要研究成果进行了归纳总结。本文可能的创新点有：第一,运用产业链融合一体化理论分析了电信产业价值链各主体的一体化转型发展趋势。价值链主体不断向其他价值环节一体化转型使得各主体之间的关系由原来单纯的上下游供给关系变成了既合作又竞争的关系。第二,运用改进的Stackelberg模型构造了电信运营商与SP之间的竞争模型。目前的文献对于运营商和SP之间的合作关系中的利益分配问题研究较多,而对两者之间竞争关系研究较少。针对运营商进入SP领域并且推出替代性业务的情况,本文借鉴Stackelberg模型建立了以运营商作为业务的追随者、SP作为领导者的竞争模型。建立了运营商与SP合作的收入分成的合作模型,在合作模型中,借鉴了目前文献将Stackelberg模型运用与供应链收入共享模型分析的研究成果,分别研究了各自利益最大化及协商后整体利益最大化的合作模型,指出经协商后合作双方的利益能够得到帕累托改进。第三,将运营商和终端商之间的关系抽象为竞争合作的委托代理关系。本文运营商和终端厂商之间竞争合作关系主要是指双方都希望各自利益最大化,因此在合作中存在竞争心理,在本文这种竞争心理不是指业务竞争,而是从各自利益角度的一种复杂的竞争心理。本文将电信产业价值链上主体——运营商与终端商之间的关系作为研究对象,通过建立委托代理模型解决双方的矛盾心理。
[Abstract]:With the development of communication technology and the increasing demand for the content and quality of communication services, the data communication service has become an important power source to promote the profit growth of the operators. At the same time, the development of the telecom industry has also brought about the profound changes in the traditional telecom industry value chain model. Service providers (SP), virtual operators, application integrators and so on, promote the division of labor in the telecommunications industry further refinement. The new telecom industry value chain, while expanding the original telecommunications content, also produces new subdivision fission, and has more value links and value content.
With the development of data business, the structure of telecom industry value chain and the relationship between the main body are becoming more and more complex, and the whole value chain has gradually exposed some problems. First, the coordination between the value subjects is not smooth. The continuous development of the data business makes more and more SP join the value chain, and SP must pass through the network platform of the operator. The user provides information, service, as the cost of using the operator's network resources, SP must pay the communication fee to the operator. In addition, the business generation SP charges the information fee. SP needs to pay a certain amount of information to the operators. The settlement problem between the two sides has become the focus of the two sides. The battalion needs to adopt the terminal customization strategy, although the terminal customization strategy can solve the compatibility problem between the terminal and the new business, the operators face the marketing risk and the cost subsidy pressure, and the terminal merchants also face the risk of their own brand being desalinated. How to solve the contradiction between the two sides, we need to find a suitable incentive scheme. Second The main body development on the value chain of the credit industry is uneven. The equipment supplier has mastered the network technical standard, the terminal business has the technical advantage, both lead the development of the technology market together; the operators master the network resources, and the other intermediate service links need to use the operator's network platform to provide the intermediate service to the user, the operator's Office In the core position of the value chain, the middle link of the telecom industry is in a relatively weak position. In order to solve the problems existing in the telecommunications industry, we must straighten out the relationship between the various subjects on the value chain of the telecommunication industry.
The telecom industry value chain has developed into the integrated network structure in the 3G era. In order to maintain its own advantages and maximize the benefits, the telecom industry value chain will constantly transform into its own upstream and downstream links to transform the.3G era value-added service market potential, and have become an important source of profit for the value chain to participate in the main body. In this case, the operator is no longer satisfied with the role of the traditional network platform provider and gradually intervened in other value chain links. For example, China Mobile's mobile flying letter service has become a model for the operators' integration transformation. On the basis of the advantages of collaterals and user resources, business innovation is realized. Telecom operators transform into the integration of content service link. Facing their strategic partner SP, there is another layer of competitive relationship between them, thus forming a complex relationship of competition cooperation. According to business, terminal compatibility support is particularly important. Terminal customization has become the inevitable trend of operator strategy selection. In the process of terminal customization, both sides hope to maximize their own interests. The strategic competing relationship between the two sides refers to the competitive relationship between the two parties in the heart, a competitive psychology of interest and cooperation in business. In the study of the current theoretical literature, the research on the composition of the value chain of the telecommunication industry, the model of value chain, the trend of the value chain and the cooperation strategy among the various subjects on the value chain are mainly focused on the research and comparison of the competing relations between the various subjects on the value chain. In addition to studying the cooperative relationship between the vertical subjects of value chain, this paper also studies the relationship of interest competition among the main bodies.
This paper analyzes the trend of the integration transformation of the main body of the telecom industry value chain, and proves that the relationship between the main bodies of the telecom industry value chain is transformed from the original simple upstream and downstream supply relationship to the relationship between you and you, and on the basis of this, the choice of the cooperation and competition relationship between the main body of the value chain is analyzed. That is to say, operators should be the core and form a symbiotic and win-win relationship with other subjects. This will lay a foundation for the study of the CO opetition relationship between the operators and the SP terminal operators.
The complex relationship between the operators and the SP stems from the transition trend of the operators. The operators' transformation is based on the following two reasons: first, the operators' own development needs and technology, demand and the assimilation competition of the industrial value chain, and two, the huge development space of the value-added services objectively stimulates the operators to the SP value-added service field. The operators transform into the value-added service market and face the SP with both partners and competitors. The relationship between the two parties is subtle and uncertain. In this paper, the competition and cooperation model of the operators and SP is established. In the competition model, the operators point out that the operators are involved in the SP value-added service market, the operators are the followers of the market, and SP is The market leader, the operator can only partially divert SP revenue, when both reach the competitive equilibrium, the business volume and profit of the operators are less than SP. in the cooperation model, and use the Stackelberg model to use the income sharing contract in the supply chain, and establish the cooperation model of the maximization of the interests and the maximum benefit of the whole. The model is solved with the same conditions, the price of information service fee, the proportion of information income, the positive correlation between the profit and the market demand, and the negative correlation with the price elasticity coefficient. The cooperation under the model of the overall profit maximization can improve the interests of the two parties in Pareto. The competition of China Mobile and the Tencent will be applied. A case study is made to make an empirical analysis.
In order to develop their own value-added services, the operators adopt a terminal customization strategy. The level of the end merchant's efforts can not be observed by the operators, and there is a principal-agent relationship between the two parties. According to the depth of the terminal business customization, the relationship between the operators and the terminal is also different. The principal-agent model of both sides under the shallow terminal customization strategy. In the principal-agent model of the operators under the shallow end customization strategy, the best incentive intensity and the influencing factors of the operators to the terminal vendors are determined. Therefore, the operators should give the terminal manufacturers appropriate incentive intensity. Finally, the terminal customization of China Mobile is applied. An empirical study is carried out in the case
The specific chapters of this article are as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction part. First, it analyzes the background and significance of the research, and sums up the problems in the process of the development of the telecom industry value chain as a root problem: the development of the main body of the value chain of the telecom industry is not balanced, and the coordination between the various subjects is not smooth and so on, which leads to the low efficiency of the overall value creation. This paper studies the cooperation and competition relationship between the main bodies of the telecom industry value chain, and then briefly introduces the research content and key problems to be solved in this paper, and makes clear the research methods of this article.
The second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review. It introduces the theoretical basis and literature review of this application, mainly including game theory and principal-agent theory, the integration theory of industrial chain integration, and summarizes the domestic and foreign research status of the telecom industry value chain, and the lack of theoretical research.
The third chapter is the composition of the telecom industry value chain. The evolution is compared with the domestic and foreign status. It introduces the composition, the evolution process and the influencing factors of the telecom industry value chain, and compares and analyzes the domestic and foreign telecom industry value chain model.
The fourth chapter analyzes the integration transformation trend of the telecom industry value subject and the selection mode of the cooperative competition relationship between the main bodies. Through the research on the integration of the various main bodies of the telecom industry value chain to the other value links, it is determined that the original supply relationship between the upper and lower reaches is transformed into the cooperative competition relationship between the main bodies and the operators. For example, the reasons for the transformation and the direction of transformation are analyzed from two aspects of theory and practice. In the case of the existence of cooperation and competition between the subject of value, the telecommunication industry is compared to the ecological system by reference to the research results of the existing literature, and the key species in the telecommunication industry ecosystem are pointed out, the telecom operators and the telecommunications industry are found. The relationship between the various subjects is a win-win relationship between the operators as the core and the other value subjects, thus laying the foundation for the research on the cooperation between the operators as the core and the SP and the terminal merchants.
The fifth chapter mainly uses the Stackelberg model theory to study the cooperation and competition relationship between the telecom operators and the SP. The principal agent theory is used to analyze the principal agent of the telecommunication industry value chain, the principal agent of the cooperative competition between the telecom operators and the terminal manufacturers. The model of competition and cooperation between operators and SP is established by game theory. The distribution ratio of operators to SP and the partition coefficient of cooperation are analyzed, and the rationality of the theoretical model is verified with actual cases. This paper takes the shallow layer terminal customization strategy to establish the principal agent model of the operator's incentive to the terminal merchants, calculates the incentive intensity of the operators to the terminal merchants, and demonstrates the theoretical analysis in combination with the actual cases. The sixth chapter is the conclusion and inspiration. The main research results of this paper are summarized.
The possible innovations in this article are as follows:
Firstly, the integration and integration theory of industrial chain integration is used to analyze the trend of the integration transformation of each subject in the value chain of the telecom industry. The integration of the subject of value chain to other value links makes the relationship between the main bodies become the relationship of both cooperation and competition from the original simple upstream and downstream supply relationship.
Second, the competitive model between telecom operators and SP is constructed by using the improved Stackelberg model. The current literature studies the problem of interest distribution in the cooperation relationship between operators and SP, but there is little research on the competition relationship between the two. Using the Stackelberg model as the followers of the business as the business, SP as the model of the leader's competition, the cooperation model of the revenue sharing between the operators and the SP is established. In the cooperation model, the research results of the current literature on the application of the Stackelberg model to the supply chain revenue sharing model are used for the study of the respective research results. After the maximization of interests and the maximization of the overall interests after negotiation, it is pointed out that after negotiation, the interests of the two parties can be improved by Pareto.
Third, the relationship between the operators and the terminal merchants is abstracted into the principal-agent relationship of competitive cooperation. The competition and cooperation relationship between the operator and the terminal manufacturer is mainly that both sides want to maximize their respective interests. Therefore, there is a competitive psychology in the cooperation. In this article, the competition psychology is not the business competition, but from their respective interests. In this paper, the relationship between the main body of the telecom industry value chain, the relationship between the operator and the terminal business, is taken as the research object, and the principal-agent model is established to solve the conflicting psychology of the two sides.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F626

【参考文献】