高管年龄与薪酬激励:理论路径与经验证据

发布时间：2018-01-04 06:14

本文关键词：高管年龄与薪酬激励:理论路径与经验证据　出处：《中国工业经济》2015年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文利用中国沪深A股上市公司2004—2012年数据,研究高管年龄对薪酬契约的影响。研究结果发现,高管年龄对薪酬水平具有显著的影响,相对年龄与绝对年龄越大的高管获得了更高水平的薪酬,但研究同时发现与薪酬存在显著关系的年龄与企业业绩之间并没有显著的相关性,并且高管年龄降低了薪酬业绩的敏感性,尤其是业绩下降时的薪酬业绩敏感性,反映高管的年龄降低了薪酬契约的有效性。进一步研究表明,高管年龄对薪酬契约的影响存在社会资本的中介作用,年龄越大的企业高管更可能具有政治资本,而这种社会资本增强了其在薪酬契约签订中的谈判力和控制力。本文的结论反映基于高管异质性特征的研究为人力资源理论、管理者权力理论以及社会资本理论在管理者薪酬契约中的应用提供了分析的视角。
[Abstract]:Using data from 2004 to 2012 China Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed companies, effects of age on executive compensation contracts. The results of the study showed that executives age has a significant impact on the salary level, the relative and absolute age of older executives to get a higher level of compensation, but the study also found that there was no significant correlation between age and there was a significant relationship between the enterprise performance and salary, and the age of executive compensation performance sensitivity is reduced, especially the pay performance sensitivity performance will decline, reflecting the executives age reduces the effectiveness of the compensation contract. Further research shows that the existence of intermediary role in the impact of social capital on the age of executive compensation contract, older corporate executives are more likely to have political capital and the social capital to enhance its bargaining power in the compensation contract signing and control. In this paper. Reflecting the research based on the heterogeneity of executives, it provides an analytical perspective for human resource theory, managerial power theory and social capital theory in the application of executive compensation contracts.

【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学会计学院;暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“社会责任投入权衡、信誉资本和公司价值创造”(批准号71372166);国家自然科学基金项目“基于制度变迁的企业社会责任报告鉴证演变机制研究”(批准号71272214)
【分类号】：F272.92;F272.91
【正文快照】： 一、问题提出现代公司制企业所有权和经营权分离,企业的经营决策权配置给管理层(代理人),为了缓解股东与管理层间的代理冲突,高管的薪酬契约成为重要的激励约束机制。最优契约理论认为,有效的薪酬契约安排能够激励管理者,使其基于股东利益最大化的原则行事。对于高管薪酬激励

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