董事长和CEO共事时长与盈余管理关系研究

发布时间：2019-03-28 16:18

【摘要】：自从盈余管理出现在大众视野,它一直都是理论界和实务界的关注焦点。高管团队作为盈余管理的关键因素更是受到国内外学者的追捧,他们从异质性等不同视角展开了丰富的研究以期找到盈余管理的特征、症结及解决方案。而对作为高管团队核心人物的董事长和CEO这方面的研究文献也颇丰,但对他们的共事时长及由此形成的价值观等组织文化是否会对盈余管理产生影响以及影响内在机理方面的研究极少见到,因此,本文的研究尝试回答这个问题并作出解释,这不仅是对盈余管理研究的一个有益补充,而且也对人力资源的配置方面提供了一个参考意见。这也正是本文研究意义所在。本论文从董事长和CEO的共事时长视角出发,研究其与盈余管理的关系。首先从高管任期和盈余管理、公司治理和盈余管理两个方面进行文献综述。其次,从理论层面分析了董事长和CEO的共事时长对盈余管理可能的影响和作用机制,并进一步对CEO权力及企业所有权性质这两个因素加以分析。接着提出假设,构建回归模型,最后通过提取我国沪深上市公司所有A股2010-2015年6年符合条件的数据予以实证检验,并对其进行回归分析,探究董事长和CEO的共事时长对盈余管理的影响以及CEO权力相对大小、不同企业所有权性质对它们关系的影响。本文研究发现,董事长和CEO的共事时长与盈余管理呈负相关关系。这可能是董事长和CEO在长期共事阶段,相互融合,默契配合,追求自身与企业的长远发展而减少了盈余管理。进一步考虑CEO权力较大的时候,董事长和CEO的共事时长与盈余管理的负相关关系较弱,这是否可以解释为CEO权力过大会导致CEO有更大的影响力参与决策,客观上增加了盈余管理的机会,为自身利益谋利从而引发盈余管理行为。再者,通过区分企业所有权性质,发现国有企业的董事长和CEO的共事时长越长,盈余管理程度更低。这可能是由于国有企业CEO评价机制多元化,董事长和CEO较多都为内部提拔和任命,受组织文化影响更深,默契程度更高,更注重自身与企业的长远发展。最后,根据以上研究结论,本文提出以下建议:第一,上市公司应适当延长董事长和CEO的共事时长;第二,加强和完善上市公司治理机制;第三,建立健全职业经理人市场;第四,健全企业CEO评价机制。
[Abstract]:Since earnings management appeared in the public view, it has always been the focus of theoretical and practical circles. As a key factor of earnings management, senior management teams have been pursued by scholars at home and abroad. They have carried out rich research from different perspectives such as heterogeneity in order to find out the characteristics, crux and solutions of earnings management. And there is also plenty of literature about the chairman and CEO, who are the core figures of the executive team. However, there are few studies on whether the organizational culture, such as the length of time they work with and the resulting values, have an impact on earnings management and the underlying mechanism. Therefore, the research in this paper attempts to answer this question and give an explanation. This is not only a useful supplement to the study of earnings management, but also provides a reference for the allocation of human resources. This is also the significance of this study. This paper studies the relationship between CEO and earnings management from the point of view of working time. Firstly, literature review is made from executive tenure and earnings management, corporate governance and earnings management. Secondly, from the theoretical level, this paper analyzes the possible influence and mechanism of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, and further analyzes the two factors of CEO power and the nature of enterprise ownership. Then put forward the hypothesis, build a regression model, and finally by extracting all the Shanghai-Shenzhen listed companies in China from 2010 to 2015 eligible data for empirical testing, and regression analysis. This paper explores the influence of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, the relative size of CEO power, and the influence of the nature of ownership of different enterprises on their relationship. In this paper, we find that there is a negative correlation between the working time between the chairman and CEO and earnings management. This may be because the chairman and CEO in the long-term phase of work, mutual integration, tacit cooperation, pursue their own and the long-term development of the enterprise and reduce earnings management. Further considering whether the negative correlation between the length of time spent working with CEO and earnings management is weak when the power of CEO is greater, can this be explained by the fact that the over-meeting of CEO power leads to greater influence in CEO's participation in decision-making? Objectively increased the opportunity of earnings management, profit for their own interests and thus lead to earnings management behavior. Moreover, by distinguishing the nature of ownership of enterprises, it is found that the longer the chairman of state-owned enterprises and CEO work together, the lower the degree of earnings management. This may be due to the diversification of the evaluation mechanism of CEO in state-owned enterprises, the promotion and appointment of the chairman and CEO are more internal, more deeply influenced by the organizational culture, the degree of tacit understanding is higher, and more attention is paid to the long-term development of themselves and enterprises. Finally, according to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: first, the listed companies should properly extend the working time between the chairman and CEO; second, strengthen and improve the governance mechanism of listed companies; thirdly, establish and improve the professional manager market; Fourth, improve the enterprise CEO evaluation mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F271

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