基于利益博弈的房地产集团公司管控模式研究

发布时间：2018-03-01 13:33

本文关键词： 集团管控模式博弈力高地产管控体系　出处：《福州大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：房地产业发展态势关系到整个国民经济的稳定发展和金融安全,研究如何保持房地产业健康发展尤为重要。在国家房地产宏观调控的进行,新一轮房地产宏观调控新政出台的密集程度和严厉程度空前,房地产企业的经营环境在进行着最为深刻的变化。房地产企业纷纷改变精简机构,优化组织架构和业务流程,实现集团化管控。在房地产企业集团化的过程中,如何妥善解决母子公司的利益博弈成为其成败的关键所在。本文首先分别从企业集团母子公司管控模式和博弈理论在集团管控领域的应用等方面进行了相关理论的研究综述。其次分别介绍了管控模式的定义、房地产企业集团管控模式的基本类型和影响管控模式选择的因素,接着阐述了博弈论的发展史及其基本概念,在此基础上,分别从企业集团母子公司之间管控博弈的纵向层面和企业集团子公司之间的横向层面分析了集团母子公司管控博弈,并进一步结合标杆企业万科集团管控模式进行分析,并分析其各自的优缺点；最后,结合力高地产集团做实证研究,通过分析力高地产集团管控现状出现问题,重点从组织架构、流程管理和绩效考核三方面进行诊断,并提出了力高地产管控体系的设计思路、步骤,设计了一套较为完善的力高集团管控体系,从而使得企业集团管控本身呈现较强的协同优化的管控特征。本文的创新之处主要体现在分别从企业集团母子公司之间管控博弈的纵向层面和企业集团子公之间的横向层面两个层级用博弈模型来分析了集团母子公司管控博弈博弈关系,并结合力高地产集团做实证研究,设计了一套较为完善的力高集团管控体系。这有助于进一步丰富和完善房地产集团管控理论,具有一定的理论意义。
[Abstract]:The development situation of the real estate industry is related to the stable development of the whole national economy and the financial security. It is particularly important to study how to keep the real estate industry developing healthily. The intensity and severity of the new macroeconomic regulation and control policy for real estate are unprecedented, and the operating environment of real estate enterprises is undergoing the most profound changes. Real estate enterprises have changed and streamlined their institutions and optimized their organizational structure and business processes. In the process of collectivization of real estate enterprises, How to properly solve the profit game of parent-subsidiary companies becomes the key to its success or failure. Firstly, this paper makes some relevant theories from the aspects of the management and control mode of parent-subsidiary companies of enterprise groups and the application of game theory in the field of group control and control. Secondly, it introduces the definition of control mode, The basic types of the real estate enterprise group management and control mode and the factors influencing the choice of the management and control mode, and then elaborated the development history and the basic concept of the game theory, and on this basis, From the vertical level of management and control game between parent and subsidiary companies of enterprise groups and the horizontal level between subsidiary companies of enterprise groups, the paper analyzes the management and control game of parent and subsidiary companies of enterprise groups, and further analyzes the management and control mode of Vanke Group, which is a benchmarking enterprise. And analyze their respective advantages and disadvantages; finally, the combination of high real estate group to do empirical research, through the analysis of high-power real estate group management problems, focusing on the organizational structure, process management and performance evaluation three aspects of diagnosis, And put forward the design ideas and steps of the management and control system of Ligao real estate, designed a set of relatively perfect management and control system of Ligao Group. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the vertical level of the management and control game between the parent and subsidiary companies of the enterprise group and between the son of the enterprise group. In the horizontal level, the game model is used to analyze the game relationship between parent and subsidiary companies. And the combination of high real estate group to do empirical research, designed a set of relatively perfect management and control system, which is helpful to further enrich and improve the theory of real estate group management and control, has a certain theoretical significance.
【学位授予单位】：福州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.233.4

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