高管薪酬与中国商业银行稳定性关系实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 20:02

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：银行稳定性　出处：《吉林大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：高管薪酬可以认为是对其努力与贡献的回报，但是高管的薪酬和绩效之间的关系是不对称的，发生极大损失时高管薪酬却没有相应的下降。过多的高管薪酬能有效地激励高管尽力提高银行绩效，但又会导致倒闭风险的剧增。高管薪酬与银行稳定性关系许多学者进行了不断的研究与探索，对此有两个观点，其中道德风险理论不适合解释中国金融市场的实际情况，其原因在于中国不存在存款保险制度，但存在较高的国有股东比率。然而在所有权与控制权分离的情况下，通常存在委托代理问题。根据委托代理理论，高管薪酬的负面影响归因于从委托代理关系产生的残余成本，即经理人的决策不完全符合股东意图。这就是世界各国经过金融危机后，争先出台‘限薪令’的原因，中国财政部2009年初也发布《金融类国有及国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理办法-征求意见稿》，尽管符合世界金融市场改革趋势，但是就受较多管制的产业容易失去国际竞争力，不利于留住较好的人才。因此，本文采用委托代理理论对于高管薪酬与银行稳定性指标之间的相关性进行实证分析，结果发现现金高管薪酬与银行稳定性之间存在显著的负相关性关系，而总高管薪酬与银行稳定性没有明显的相关性，薪酬绩效弹性与银行稳定性之间没有相关性，最后信用贷款比率与高管薪酬之间存在正相关关系，而与房地产与建筑业贷款比率不存在相关性。根据上述实证分析结果，本文认为商业银行通过强化股东决定薪酬的权利，确保薪酬委员会的对立性以及引入限制性股票激励方式充分发挥薪酬激励机制在商业银行公司治理和风险管控中的导向作用，同时建立健全科学有效的公司治理机制，以促进国内商业银行稳健经营和可持续发展。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation can be seen as a reward for effort and contribution, but the relationship between executive pay and performance is asymmetrical. Executive pay does not fall in response to heavy losses. Excessive executive pay can be an effective incentive for executives to do their best to improve bank performance. However, it will lead to a sharp increase in the risk of bankruptcy. Many scholars have studied and explored the relationship between executive compensation and bank stability, and there are two points of view, among which the theory of moral hazard is not suitable to explain the actual situation in China's financial market. The reason is that there is no deposit insurance system in China, but there is a high ratio of state-owned shareholders. However, in the case of separation of ownership and control, there is usually a principal-agent problem. The negative effect of executive compensation is attributed to the residual cost from the principal-agent relationship, that is, the manager's decision is not entirely in line with the shareholders' intention. This is why countries around the world, after the financial crisis, rushed to issue 'pay restraint orders'. At the beginning of 2009, the Ministry of Finance of China also issued "measures for the Management of compensation for Heads of State-Owned and State-owned holding Enterprises in Finance-draft for comments." although in line with the trend of financial market reform in the world, industries subject to more control are vulnerable to losing international competitiveness. Therefore, this paper uses principal-agent theory to analyze the correlation between executive compensation and bank stability index. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between cash executive compensation and bank stability, but there is no significant correlation between total executive compensation and bank stability, and there is no correlation between compensation performance elasticity and bank stability. Finally, there is a positive correlation between credit loan ratio and executive compensation, but no correlation with real estate loan ratio and construction loan ratio. According to the above empirical analysis results, this paper argues that commercial banks strengthen the right of shareholders to determine compensation. To ensure the opposites of the compensation committee and the introduction of restrictive stock incentives to give full play to the guiding role of the compensation incentive mechanism in the corporate governance and risk management of commercial banks, and to establish a scientific and effective corporate governance mechanism. In order to promote the domestic commercial banks stable management and sustainable development.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.33

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