土地市场化背景下土地使用权招标出让的委托代理分析

发布时间：2018-05-19 10:55

本文选题：土地市场 + 土地使用权　；参考：《西南大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：1987年12月,深圳市首次公开拍卖—宗国有土地使用权,这次土地拍卖是建国后中国第一次把土地使用权作为资产进入市场,这意味着土地开始作为商品走向市场,宣告了土地市场的诞生。之后在较长的时间内,协议出让的方式长期占据国有土地出让方式的主导地位；由于土地协议出让的方式是市场化程度较低的交易方式,在加上各级地方政府的自由裁量权过大,这就使得寻租行为和腐败行为频发,造成政府无法获得正常市场化的土地出让收益,致使巨额国有土地资产流失,严重制约了土地市场的健康发展,危害巨大。为改变这种状况,为营造公正、公开、公平的土地出让市场,规范国有土地的出让行为,获取正常市场化的土地收益：中华人民共和国国土资源部于2002年5月9日发布了《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有土地使用权规定》,之后中华人民共和国国土资源部和监察部于2004年3月联合下发了《关于继续开展经营性土地使用权招标拍卖挂牌出让情况执法监察工作的通知》,该文件明确要求从2004年8月31日开始所有经营性用地都要采用招标拍卖挂牌公开竞价的方式出让,这意味着《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有土地使用权规定》这一制度在全国全面展开施行。随后2007年9月28日国土资源部依据物权法及其他相关法律法规的法理原则,发布了39号令《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有建设用地使用权规定》。这些就助推了土地市场的进一步深入发展。土地出让招拍挂制度的实施确实进一步优化了土地资源配置,显化了土地的正常市场价值,地方政府土地出让的收入也在不断增长,而且土地出让经济收益极大化的好处也充分显现,这样“土地财政效应”逐渐异化为各级地方政府追逐的目标,为了获得更高的土地出让收入,地方政府广泛运用“价高者得”的拍卖和挂牌出让方式,这样各地土地出让价格不断上涨,从而引发房地产价格非理性过快上涨。党中央和国务院充分意识到问题的严重性,一直都在致力于调控。面对日益严重的地价和房价形势,从2010年开始党中央和国务院加大了调控力度,出台了一系列的调控措施：如明确要求各地要合理确定土地供应方式和内容,探索土地出让综合评标方法；明确要求在坚持和完善土地招拍挂制度的同时,要积极探索“综合评标”、“一次竞价”、“双向竞价”等出让方式。中央政府的调控目的是进一步完善土地出让制度,改进当前国有土地市场化出让的方式,以期稳定地价和房价。土地使用权招标出让是国有土地市场化出让中的重要方式,因而研究土地市场化下国有土地使用权招标出让是必然的现实需求。当前直接专门研究国有土地使用权招标出让的文献较为少见,它们或是综合笼统地分析国有土地招标出让的现状与问题,或是简要分析国有土地使用权招投标的价格均衡策略,或是浅显的定性探讨国有土地使用权招标出让与地价、房价的关系；这些零散、不系统的研究还不能满足现实需求。本研究从理论上扩展了国有土地使用权招标出让的研究视角,丰富深化了国有土地使用权招标出让的研究内容和研究框架,提出了应对当前国有土地使用权招标出让系列问题的措施与思路,能为政府进一步规范和完善土地出让制度的实践提供相应的参考与借鉴。国有土地使用权实行市场化出让是土地市场化发展的必然趋势与要求,经营性国有土地使用权招标出让是国有土地使用权实行市场化出让的重要方式和手段,本文以土地市场化背景下国有土地使用权公开招标出让为研究对象,主要采用文献研究法、案例与实例分析法、定量实证研究法、博弈研究法等方法进行研究；其中主要以委托代理理论为分析研究的依据,对经营性国有土地使用权公开招标出让中的几大主要参与主体(政府部门直接招标出让人、评标人及投标人等)的激励和约束机制进行了深入研究,最终本论文得出以下主要研究结论。 (1)把市、县国土资源行政主管部门或其指定授权的下属事业单位当作具有同一性质的政府部门直接招标人来进行分析。得出了在中国现有政治行政体制下,国有土地产权形成了如下行政性委托代理链：全国人民——全国人民代表大会——中央政府国务院——各地方政府——各地方政府国土资源行政主管部门——地方国土资源行政主管部门具体的工作人员。具体到国有土地使用权招标出让中,当地方政府国土资源行政主管部门直接作为招标人时的激励、约束会出现如下主要问题：由行政性委托代理引发的上级委托人难于考核下级代理人,上级委托人对下级代理人约束软化和政治激励不兼容以及出现短期和机会主义行为等。然后主要运用主成分分析法和回归分析法从全国层面和以重庆市、上海市、甘肃省为例的地方政府的层面对现有土地出让委托代理激励、约束的问题进行了较为详尽的实证解释与验证。在现有的行政委托代理下政府的国土资源行政主管部门既是国有土地产权的代表也是土地的管理者,既承担国有土地所有者的经营职能也承担政府行政管理部门的土地管理职能,集经营职能与管理职能于一身,必然会造成职能错位,行为失范、责任模糊、激励不兼容、约束软化等内生性问题。基于此笔者提出了现有上地产权委托代理激励、约束的改进设想,构建土地产权的市场性委托,把土地的经营职能从政府国土资源行政主管部门剥离出去,建立国有土地经营公司,政府与国有土地经营公司之间通过市场性委托合约进行连接,然后对政府部门直接招标出让人的激励约束就换化为对国有土地经营公司经营代理人的激励和约束。 (2)国有土地使用权招标出让中招标人与评标人的委托代理关系中存在的主要问题有：评标劳务报酬固定化,总体报酬水平不高,报酬的正向激励缺乏；评标人的主观随意行为倾向可能性大,影响评标结果的公正公平性；评标人所拥有的权利和应承担的责任反差大、不对等。虽然固定报酬模型理论上对评标人的激励是可行的,但是具体实际度量满足评标人参与约束与激励相容约束是很困难的,而结合目前施行的评标报酬普遍偏低的情况来看,固定报酬模型存在先天的激励缺陷,需要进一步改进；因而笔者提出了定酬+奖励(f+j)的激励报酬模型,并分析了激励模型的求解。之后以评标人的激励报酬机制为基础,构建了基于声誉影响函数的激励机制,而且声誉激励机制也验证了实行激励报酬机制的必要性。然后对激励机制进行了具体的算例数理验证分析；研究表明激励报酬激励机制相较于固定报酬对评标人能有更大的激励动力,能有更好的激励效果。之后从制定并完善对评标专家进行统一管制的法规、建立并完善具体的管理制度、追加对评标人的后期评估、对评标专家进行动态管理这四个方面探析了评标人约束机制的构建。 (3)依据当前地价、房价的实际情况和国家宏观调控的需求导向,对国家调控所提倡的国有土地使用权综合评标出让法从商务标评价体系表和技术标评价体系表两个方面进行了较为详尽的例举综合分析；然后运用层次分析法和模糊综合评价法进行了具体的实例分析,并对两种方法的结果进行了对比分析与探讨；这些实例分析对当前国有土地使用权出让方式的改进作出了有益的探索。 (4)之前经营性国有土地使用权协议出让的制度有先天的重大缺陷,该制度的实行给市场需求主体、土地资源的配置和利用、党和政府的公信力、社会的福利水平和社会的运行都带来严重的负面影响,而且正是这些因素推动了国有土地使用权出让制度的变迁。于是原有制度被变革为经营性国有土地使用权实行招标、拍卖和挂牌公开出让的制度,相对于以往的经营性国有土地使用权实行协议出让的制度,国有上地使用权实行公开招标出让,这对土地潜在购买利用人或投标人来说就是天然的最有效的激励方式。与协议出让相比当国有土地使用权实行公开招标出让时,这能减少土地潜在购买利用人或投标人的交易成本、提升他们参与公平竞争的信心,提高他们公平经营获利的可能性和概率；因而土地潜在购买利用人或投标人有强烈的正向参与激励。然后以2004年为分界点,主要运用相关分析和回归分析等方法从土地的供给方地方政府和土地的需求方房地产开发企业这两个方面,采用全国层面的数据和重庆市层面的数据,对经营性用地协议出让为主的制度激励效果与招拍挂出让的制度激励效果进行了对比实证分析。 (5)在国有土地使用权招标出让的具体活动实践中,投标人采用单边支付的合谋机制具有有效性和激励相容性,是有效率的,单边支付成为投标人合谋时的占优现实选择。国有土地使用权招标出让中投标人合谋的危害性巨大,不容小视,必须要积极应对。以上述分析为基础,建立国有土地使用权招标出让中投标人围标合谋的动态贝叶斯博弈模型,再对投标人的围标合谋行为进行相应的信号博弈分析,再结合具体的实际案例对动态贝叶斯博弈模型进行了相应的验证分析。之后依据动态贝叶斯博弈模型的分析结论,从吸引更多的投标参与者、合理设置出让底价、适当控制单次出让土地的面积、完善招投标的相关法律制度、构建市场诚信体系等方面提出了约束投标人合谋行为的措施。 (6)依据国有土地使用权招标出让的实际情形,再进一步分析了国有土地使用权招标出让中存在的监察方政府、投标人、评标人及招标出让人这几个主要的参与主体；然后从四大方面详细阐释了投标人、评标人及招标出让人多方合谋的形成原因,并解析了他们多方合谋的三种主要发起方式。再分类型分别构建了他们多方合谋的不同博弈模型进行分析,之后结合多方博弈分析的结论,从监察体系的建设、交易信息的公开透明、监督与举报奖励机制的建立、合谋成本的增加、合谋参与方惩罚力度的强化等方面提出了约束多方合谋的措施。综上所述,本文结合现实需求,主要依据委托代理理论来系统深入地研究土地市场化背景下国有土地使用权招标出让的问题,这是全新的研究视角；分层分类详细深入地解析了国有土地使用权招标出让中几大主要参与主体之间委托代理的主要问题,然后主要以激励机制和约束机制为研究的突破口提出了应对国有土地使用权招标出让系列问题的措施与思路；这些都是新的研究探索,具有一定的创新价值。
[Abstract]:In December 1987, the first public auction in Shenzhen - the land use right of Zong, the land auction was the first time after the founding of the people's Republic of China to enter the market with the right to use land as an asset, which means that the land began to go to the market as a commodity and declared the birth of the land market. In a long period of time, the mode of the agreement was occupied for a long time. The dominant position of the state-owned land transfer mode is that the land agreement is sold in a way of low degree of marketization, with the excessive discretion of local governments at all levels, which makes the rent-seeking behavior and corruption frequent, resulting in the government can not obtain the normal marketable land transfer income, resulting in a huge amount of state-owned land. In order to change this situation, in order to create a fair, open and fair land sale market, standardize the selling behavior of state-owned land and obtain the normal market income, the Ministry of soil resources of People's Republic of China issued a "bid auction listing" in May 9, 2002. In March 2004, the Ministry of land and resources of People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Supervision jointly issued a notice on the implementation of the law enforcement supervision on the continuation of the bidding and auction of the right to bid for operational land use. The document clearly requires that all operational land should be adopted from August 31, 2004. The sale of public bidding for bidding and auction, which means that the system of the right to use state-owned land for auction by auction and auction is carried out all over the country. In September 28, 2007, the Ministry of land and resources issued 39 orders according to the legal principles of property law and other related laws and regulations. The provision of the right to use land is more than that, which boosts the further development of the land market.
The implementation of the land leasing system has indeed further optimized the allocation of land resources, displayed the normal market value of the land, and the income of the land transfer of the local government is increasing, and the benefits of the extreme economic benefit of the land transfer are fully manifested, so the "land finance effect" has gradually dissimilated to the local governments at all levels. In order to obtain higher land transfer income, local governments have widely used the auction and listing method of "high price persons", so that the prices of land transfer in all parts of the country are rising, thus causing real estate prices to rise rapidly. The Party Central Committee and the State Council fully realize the seriousness of the problem and have been working on the adjustment of the problem. In the face of the increasingly serious land price and house price situation, the Party Central Committee and the State Council have increased its regulation and control since 2010, and introduced a series of regulatory measures, such as a clear requirement for the rational determination of land supply modes and contents, and the exploration of the comprehensive evaluation method of land leasing, and clearly required to adhere to and perfect the system of land bidding and hanging. At the same time, we should actively explore "comprehensive bid evaluation", "one bidding price" and "two-way bidding". The purpose of the central government's regulation and control is to further improve the land leasing system and improve the current mode of market transfer of state-owned land in order to stabilize the land price and house price. The important way is to study the tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land under the land market. The current direct special research on the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right is relatively rare. They are or is a comprehensive analysis of the status and problems of the state-owned land tendering and leasing, or a brief analysis of the use of the state-owned land. The price equilibrium strategy of the bid, or a simple qualitative discussion on the relationship between the bid selling of the state-owned land use right and the land price and the house price; these scattered and unsystematic research can not meet the actual needs. This study extends the research perspective of the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right in theory, enriches the tenure of the state-owned land use right. The research content and the research framework put forward the measures and ideas to deal with the problems of the current tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land, which can provide the reference and reference for the government to further standardize and improve the practice of the land transfer system.
The market oriented transfer of the right to use state-owned land is the inevitable trend and requirement of the development of the land market, and the bidding and selling of the operating state-owned land use right is an important way and means for the market transfer of the state-owned land use right. In this paper, under the background of the land market, the state-owned land makes public bidding for the use of the right to study the main object. Using the literature research method, case and case analysis, quantitative empirical research, game research method and other methods, the principal agent theory is the basis for the analysis and research, and the main participants in the public bidding and selling of the operating state-owned land use right (the direct tendering and bid assignor, the bid evaluators and the investment of the government departments) The incentive and restraint mechanism of the target person and so on has been thoroughly studied.
(1) analyze the municipal and county administrative departments of land and resources or the subordinate institutions designated by them as the direct tenders of the government departments with the same nature. Under the existing political administrative system in China, the state owned land property rights have formed the following administrative entrustment chain: the people of the whole country - the National People's representative The State Council of the central government - the local government - the local government - the administrative department of land and resources of the local governments - the specific staff of the administrative department of local land and resources. There will be the following main problems: the principal agent initiated by the administrative agency is difficult to examine the lower agent, the superior principal is not compatible with the softening of the lower agent and the incompatibility of the political incentive as well as the short-term and opportunism, and then mainly uses the principal component analysis and the regression analysis method from the national level and Chongqing. City, Shanghai, Gansu Province, as an example, the local government is faced with the existing land leasing agent incentive, the constraints are more detailed empirical interpretation and verification. Under the existing administrative agency, the government department of land and resources administration is both the representative of the state-owned land property right and the land manager, not only the state-owned land management, but also the state. The management function of the owner of the land also bears the land management function of the government administrative department, which sets the management function and the management function in one. It will inevitably result in the internal problems such as the function dislocation, the anomie of the behavior, the blur responsibility, the incompatibility and the softening. Based on this author, the author puts forward the incentive and restraint of the existing land property rights agent. It is conceived to construct a market entrustment of land property rights, to remove the operation function of land from the administrative department of land and resources of the government, to establish a state-owned land management company, to connect the government to the state-owned land management company through a market entrustment contract, and then to change the incentive and constraint of the direct tendering transferor of the government department. In order to encourage and restrict the management agents of state-owned land operation companies.
(2) the main problems in the principal-agent relationship between the bidder and the bid evaluators in the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right are: the fixed remuneration for the bid evaluation, the low overall remuneration level, the lack of positive incentive for the remuneration, the large possibility of the subjective random behavior of the bid evaluators, the impartiality and fairness of the bid evaluation results; the bid evaluation people's support There is a great difference between some rights and responsibilities that should be undertaken. Although the incentive of the fixed reward model is feasible in theory, it is very difficult for the bidders to participate in the constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. The incentive defect of the day needs further improvement; therefore, the author puts forward the incentive compensation model of the remuneration plus incentive (f+j), and analyzes the solution of the incentive model. After that, the incentive mechanism based on the reputation impact function is built on the basis of the incentive reward mechanism of the bid evaluators, and the reputation incentive mechanism also verifies the incentive reward mechanism. It is necessary. Then, a specific example is made to verify the incentive mechanism. The study shows that incentive reward incentive mechanism can have greater incentive power and better incentive effect than fixed remuneration. After that, it can establish and perfect the regulations of unified control of the evaluation experts, and establish and improve the specific management. The system, supplemental to the late evaluation of bidders, and dynamic management of bidders, explores the establishment of the bid evaluation mechanism of four aspects.
(3) according to the current land price, the actual situation of house prices and the demand of the national macro-control, the comprehensive analysis of the two aspects of the comprehensive bid evaluation method of the state-owned land use right, which is advocated by the state regulation and control, is carried out in detail from the scale of the evaluation system of the business standard and the table of the evaluation system of the technical standard; then, the analytic hierarchy process and the fuzzy comprehensive analysis are used. The combined evaluation method has carried on the concrete example analysis, and has carried on the contrast analysis and the discussion to the result of the two methods; the example analysis makes the beneficial exploration to the current state-owned land use right transfer way improvement.
(4) the system of selling the right to use the state-owned land before the operation of the state-owned land has a major inborn defect. The system has brought serious negative impact on the market demand subject, the allocation and utilization of land resources, the public credibility of the party and the government, the welfare level of the society and the operation of the society, and it is precisely these factors that promote the state land. With the change of the system of the right to sell, the original system has been transformed into a system of tendering, auction and publicly selling of the right to use the state-owned land, and the system of selling the right to use the state-owned land use right in relation to the former operating state-owned land use right. The most effective way of motivation is natural. Compared with the agreement transfer, when the state-owned land use right is sold by public bidding, it can reduce the transaction cost of potential buyers or bidders, improve their confidence in fair competition, and increase the probability and probability of their fair operation profit. The potential buyer or bidder has a strong positive participation incentive. Then with 2004 as the demarcation point, the main use of correlation analysis and regression analysis, from the land supply side of the local government and land demand side real estate development enterprises in two aspects, using data from the national level and the data of the Chongqing level, to the management. The incentive effect of the land transfer agreement is compared with the incentive effect of the system.
(5) in the concrete activities of the tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land, the conspiracy mechanism of the unilateral payment by the bidder has the effectiveness and incentive compatibility. It is efficient. The unilateral payment becomes the dominant reality choice when the bidder collusion. The state-owned land use right marked out that the conspiracy of the bidder is very harmful and can not be ignored, On the basis of the above analysis, the dynamic Bias game model of the bidder's conspiracy in the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right is established, and then the corresponding signal game analysis is carried out on the conspiracy behavior of the bidders, and the corresponding verification points are carried out on the dynamic Attitudebeus game model combined with the concrete actual cases. Then according to the analysis conclusions of the dynamic Bias game model, the measures to restrict the collusion behavior of the bidder are put forward from the aspects of attracting more participants, setting up the bottom price, controlling the area of the land, perfecting the relevant legal system of bidding and constructing the market credit system and so on.
(6) according to the actual situation of the tendering and selling of the right to use state-owned land, the tendering of the right to use state-owned land is further analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：西南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F301.2

【参考文献】