中国经营性土地使用权招拍挂出让机制的理论和实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-26 18:53

本文选题：招拍挂出让机制 + 拍卖理论　；参考：《上海交通大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：自2004年以来，经营性土地使用权的招拍挂出让机制在我国土地市场中的核心地位得以确立。但现实数据表明，在不同时期和不同地域，招标、拍卖和挂牌三种出让方式均得到不同程度的应用，而且这三种出让方式形成的土地价格也存在差别。根据拍卖理论中对收入等价定理的拓展研究，不同的假设条件，例如竞标者的价值结构、对称性、进入成本、是否允许重复进入等，都会对各种拍卖模型形成的成交价格带来不同的影响。而且，在规定实施招拍挂机制的前提下，地方政府可在招标、拍卖和挂牌三种出让方式中进行选择，因此当不同出让方式的土地价格存在差别时，不同地域的地方政府会出于各种目的，在不同时期选择不同的方式出让土地使用权，进而造成了各出让方式在不同时期和地域内得到不同程度的应用的现象。此外，地方政府还可对当地的招拍挂机制进行微调，例如上海市在2007年将住宅用地挂牌出让的现场竞价规则由公开升价拍卖修改为一价封闭式拍卖，重庆市土地交易部门则根据竞买人的数量确定出让方式，北京市还针对保障性住房用地的出让创立了一些新的出让机制，通过分析这些微调政策对土地价格的影响，能够揭示地方政府采取这些举措的目的。本文研究的主要问题就在于通过对土地使用权招拍挂出让方式的理论和实证研究，比较不同出让方式形成的土地价格，并在此基础上分析地方政府在土地出让中的行为，以解释招拍挂出让机制在我国土地市场中的应用模式。造成收入等价定理不成立的前提条件可能有很多种，因此在对招拍挂出让方式进行理论研究之前，首先需要根据我国土地市场的现状、开发商的特征以及竞价行为抽象出合理的假设，并根据招拍挂机制的特点建立相应的拍卖模型。本文假设竞标者之间价值相容且存在信息不对称，建立可显示信息且第一阶段允许重复进入的两阶段升价拍卖模型对挂牌机制进行理论刻画，指出专业竞标者在第一阶段隐藏信息的行为造成了竞价集中在现场竞价阶段的现象。本文利用第一阶段可显示信息且允许重复进入的混合拍卖模型对上海市改革后的挂牌方式进行理论分析，指出上海市的这一改革举措加强了专业竞标者在挂牌阶段隐藏信息的动机，进而会降低土地成交价格。此外，本文还建立了可显示信息的单阶段升价拍卖模型以及不公开保留价格的一价拍卖模型分别对拍卖和招标机制进行均衡分析。在得到竞标者均衡策略的基础上，对不同出让机制的成交价格进行理论比较，得到了本文的主要理论结果。在实证研究中，本文利用现实数据对理论假设和模型的合理性进行验证，并利用我国重点地市的土地交易数据对主要理论结果进行验证。为了解决选择样本数据时出现的选择性偏差，本文采用两步回归法，，一方面通过对土地价格建立回归模型，比较不同出让机制形成的土地价格，另一方面通过对地方政府的行为建立回归模型，分析地方政府在选择出让方式时的行为，并解释各种出让方式在不同时期和不同地域的应用。本文的理论和实证研究得到了以下的结论：挂牌机制形成的土地价格始终高于招标机制；当现场竞价阶段更有可能显示信息时，上海市革新后的挂牌机制能够有效降低土地价格；当拍卖机制中有更多竞标者参与时，拍卖机制形成的土地价格高于挂牌机制。由于挂牌方式既能够促进交易又可推高土地价格，因此得到地方政府的青睐，在全国的土地市场中得到了最广泛的运用；招标方式则因为能够降低土地价格而被作为一种有效的调控措施，在房地产市场过热的时期和地区得到应用；上海市革新后的挂牌机制的确可降低土地价格，因而在上海市住宅用地的出让市场中被沿用至今；拍卖机制则能够形成更高的土地价格，因此至今仍在经营性用地供给不足且土地公开交易市场较为落后的重庆市得到运用。本文的研究还指出北京市地方政府虽然在短期内会追求更高的土地出让收入，但长期内仍会服从中央政府对房地产市场进行调控。但重庆市地方政府在选择出让方式时的目的则单纯是为了获得更高的土地价格，这也是其根据参与竞价的开发商数量自动调整出让方式的原因。除招拍挂机制之外，近年来我国土地市场中还出现了一些新型的出让方式。本文对北京市土地市场中推行的“限地价，竞配建”挂牌方式和“定配建，竞地价”招标方式进行了理论研究，指出在限制拍卖起始价的前提下，结合“溢价率超50%需上报”的规定，“限地价，竞配建”方式可有效控制地价并促进保障房的开发。但在地价相同时，“限地价，竞配建”挂牌方式可引导开发商建设更多的保障房；在保障房建设面积相同时，“定配建，竞地价”招标方式则可形成更低的土地价格。因此地方政府可根据不同的政策重点选择更有效的出让方式。本文的研究结论为完善土地出让机制和规范地方政府行为提供了一些建议。首先，实行招拍挂出让机制的根本目的在于使土地作为一种国有资产的价值得到充分体现，这可以从多个方面得以实现。一方面，可通过向缺乏经验的中小开发商提供更多信息，或要求所有竞标者必须在公开挂牌阶段的每轮竞价中出价，又或者延长挂牌阶段和现场竞价阶段中每轮竞价的持续时间，可促进竞价过程中的信息显示。另一方面，还可通过降低中小开发商的融资成本、减小单次出让地块的规模，或鼓励竞标者联合竞价，鼓励更多的中小开发商参与竞价。其次，虽然挂牌机制可促进交易，但同时也会推高土地价格，为避免地方政府以恢复市场活力的名义过度使用挂牌方式推高地价，可规定一定时期内地方政府使用招标方式的比例。中央政府应要求地价较高的东部城市加强市场调控，同时应允许土地交易市场落后的中西部城市对招拍挂机制进行微调，以调整土地供给结构并培养更成熟的市场环境。最后，针对地方政府追求土地出让收入的动因，除了将房价和地价的控制、以及保障房的建设纳入对地方政府官员的政绩考核体系之外，中央政府还应加快财税体制的改革。本文的研究意义在于提供了一个规范的研究框架来分析土地价格的形成机制以及地方政府在土地出让中的行为：利用拍卖理论，结合土地市场现状，抽象出合理的假设并建立合适的拍卖模型刻画招拍挂机制，在均衡分析的基础上比较不同出让机制形成的土地价格，进而解释不同出让机制下土地价格的形成机理，以及招拍挂机制在不同时期和不同地域的运用模式，并从中剖析地方政府的行为。这些研究能够为完善招拍挂出让机制，规范地方政府行为提供一些政策方面的启示和建议。同时，本文还得到一些不同于已有研究的结论。在价值相容假设下，向竞标者提供有关对手何时退出的信息反而会降低卖方的期望收入。竞标者可能会在混合拍卖的升价拍卖中隐藏信息，使混合拍卖相对于一价拍卖的优势不复存在；而且，虽然当竞标者之间存在信息不对称时，混合拍卖中的一价拍卖会使弱势竞标者出价更为进取，但这一效应仍无法超越可显示信息的升价拍卖模型中的信息显示对价格的提升作用，因此混合拍卖相对于可显示信息的升价拍卖的优势也不复存在。
[Abstract]:Since 2004, the core position of the operating land use right has been established in the land market of our country. But the actual data show that in different periods and different regions, the three ways of bidding, auction and listing have been applied in different degrees, and the land prices of the three modes of selling also exist. According to the expansion of the income equivalence theorem in the auction theory, the different assumptions, such as the value structure of the bidder, the symmetry, the entry cost, and the allowable entry, will have different effects on the transaction price formed by the various auction models. The government can choose three ways of bidding, auction and listing. Therefore, when there are different land prices in different ways of selling, the local governments of different regions will choose different ways to sell the land use right in different periods for various purposes, thus causing the different ways to get different ways in different periods and regions. In addition, the local government can also make a slight adjustment to local register system, for example, in 2007, the bidding rules for the live auction of residential land in Shanghai were changed from open bid auction to one price closed auction, and the Land Trading Department of Chongqing was determined by the number of bidders, Beijing City. In addition, some new transfer mechanisms have been set up for the transfer of land for affordable housing. Through the analysis of the impact of these fine tune policies on land prices, the purpose of these measures can be revealed. The main problem of this paper is the theoretical and Empirical Study of the way of selling land use right. The land price formed by the way of transfer is made, and on this basis, the behavior of local government in the land transfer is analyzed in order to explain the application mode of the mechanism in the land market of our country.
There are many kinds of prerequisites that cause the income equivalence theorem not to be established, so before the theoretical research on the way to hang out the auction, it is necessary to abstract reasonable assumptions according to the current situation of the land market, the characteristics of the developers and the bidding behavior, and establish the corresponding auction model according to the characteristics of the registration system. Assuming that the value of the bidder is compatible and has information asymmetry, the two stage auction model which can display information and the first stage allows repeated entry is described in theory. It is pointed out that the behavior of the professional bidder in the first stage of information hiding causes the phenomenon in the competition stage in the competition set. In the first stage, the mixed auction model which can display information and allow repeated entry is analyzed theoretically in Shanghai after the reform. It is pointed out that this reform measures in Shanghai strengthen the motivation of the professional bidder to hide the information at the stage of listing, and then reduce the land transaction price. In addition, this paper also establishes the information that can be displayed. The single stage auction model and the one price auction model that do not open the price are analyzed in equilibrium for auction and bidding mechanism. On the basis of winning bidder equilibrium strategy, the theoretical comparison of transaction prices of different transfer mechanisms is compared, and the main theoretical results are obtained. In the empirical study, the actual number is used in this paper. The theoretical hypothesis and the rationality of the model are verified, and the main theoretical results are verified by the land transaction data of the key cities in China. In order to solve the selective deviation of the selected sample data, the two step regression method is adopted in this paper. On the one hand, the regression model of the land price lattice is established to compare the formation of different transfer mechanisms. On the other hand, the land price, on the other hand, through the establishment of a regression model of local government behavior, analyze the behavior of local government in choosing the way of selling, and explain the application of various modes of transfer in different periods and different regions.
The following conclusions are obtained: the land price formed by the listing mechanism is always higher than the bidding mechanism; when the competition stage is more likely to show information, the mechanism of Shanghai's reform can effectively reduce the land price; when more bidders participate in the auction mechanism, the auction mechanism is formed. The land price is higher than the listing mechanism. As the way of listing can both promote trade and push up the land price, it gets the favor of local government and gets the most extensive use in the land market of the whole country; the way of bidding is overheated in the real estate market because it can reduce the land price. The period and area have been applied, and the mechanism of Shanghai's renovation can indeed reduce the price of land, so it has been used in the market of the residential land in Shanghai so far; the auction mechanism can form a higher land price, and so far is still in Chongqing, which is still in poor operating land and is relatively backward in the open trading market. The study also points out that Beijing local government will pursue higher land leasing income in the short term, but it will still obey the central government's regulation on the real estate market for a long time. But the purpose of Chongqing local government in choosing the way of selling is simply to get higher land price, which is also the same. According to the number of developers participating in bidding, the reasons for automatic adjustment of the way of selling are automatically adjusted.
In addition to the mechanism of bidding and hanging, there have been some new ways of selling in the land market in recent years. In this paper, a theoretical study is made on the mode of "limit land price, competition and construction" and the way of bidding in Beijing, which is carried out in the land market, and points out that the premium rate is combined with the premise of restricting the initial price of the auction. At the same time, the "limit land price, competition and construction" can guide the developers to build more security rooms. At the same time, the way of "setting up construction and bidding price" can form more than 50%. Low land prices. Therefore, local governments can choose more effective ways of selling according to different policy priorities.
The conclusion of this paper provides some suggestions for improving the land leasing mechanism and standardizing local government behavior. First, the fundamental purpose of the mechanism is to fully embody the value of land as a state-owned asset, which can be realized in many ways. On the one hand, it can be developed through the lack of experience. To provide more information, or to ask all bidders to bid in each round of the bidding stage, or to extend the duration of each round in the stage of listing and in the competition stage, it can promote the information display during the bidding process. On the other hand, it can also reduce the cost of financing by reducing the financing cost of small and medium-sized developers and reduce the single transfer. The size of the plot, or encourage bidders to join the bid, encourage more small and medium-sized developers to participate in the bid. Second, although the listing mechanism can promote the transaction, it will also push up the land price, so as to avoid the overuse of high land price in the name of the local government in the name of restoring the vitality of the market, the local government can use it for a certain period of time. The central government should require the central government to strengthen market regulation and control in the eastern cities with higher land prices. At the same time, the central and western cities of the central and western regions should be allowed to adjust the register system to adjust the land supply structure and cultivate a more mature market environment. The central government should also accelerate the reform of the fiscal and tax system in addition to the control of house prices and land prices, and the construction of the guarantee housing for the performance appraisal system of local government officials.
The significance of this study is to provide a normative research framework to analyze the formation mechanism of land price and the behavior of local governments in land transfer: using auction theory, combining the status of the land market, abstracting reasonable assumptions and establishing a suitable auction model to portray the register system of auction, on the basis of equilibrium analysis. The land price, which is formed by different transfer mechanism, explains the formation mechanism of land price under different transfer mechanism, and the application mode of the system in different periods and different regions, and analyzes the behavior of local government. These studies can provide some policies to improve the mechanism and standardize the behavior of local government. Apocalypse and suggestion.
At the same time, this paper also obtains some conclusions which are different from the existing research. Under the hypothesis of value compatibility, providing the bidder with information about when to exit will reduce the expected income of the seller. The bidder may hide the information in the rising price auction of the mixed auction, so that the advantage of the mixed auction is not to exist at the one price auction; In addition, although there is information asymmetry between bidders, the one price auction in the mixed auction will make the disadvantaged bid more aggressive, but this effect can not exceed the promotion effect of information display on the price in the rising auction model that can show the information, so the advantage of the mixed auction is to sell the advantages of the rising auction which is relative to the information that can be displayed. No longer exist.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F301.2;F724.59

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