房地产市场的多方博弈分析
发布时间：2018-08-17 10:46
【摘要】：房地产业是一个复杂的大系统,它关乎国计民生,被经济学家概括为我国经济发展的两个“火车头”之一,一直以来都是整个社会关注的重大热点民生问题。我国近几年来出现的房地产市场过热现象,可以各种力量和利益集团博弈的综合结果：中央政府的高度集权和对房地产业的过度市场化,地方政府追求利益的短期化和各部门间相互协调的困难,房地产商各自追求高额利润的本性和他们之间默契的垄断行为,以及消费者的投机心理和对调控政策的反向预期等等。基于以上事实,本文利用研究博弈主体的行为发生直接相互作用时的决策及这种决策的均衡问题的博弈理论,将房地产市场中的各个主体行为理论化为几个典型的博弈模型,求出各博弈的合理均衡解,并试图解读这些均衡解的现实经济意义,得到相应结论。从而为今后的房地产市场提供参考意见,使其健康长久的发展。 本文共分五个部分,主要内容如下： 第一部分,引言。这一部分主要介绍本文所用的研究方法及研究意义,综述在我国房地产市场博弈中各个的主体行为特征。最后对博弈论的产生和发展进行了简要的介绍； 第二部分,房地产博弈的基本要素。这一部分为房地产市场博弈中的要素分析,集中在对主体和客体的博弈特征分析上 第三部分,具体博弈分析。这是本文的重点,也是理论论证的部分,结合相关的政策对各种博弈进行理论上的分析； 第四部分,实际案例分析。这一部分将以第三部分为基础,引入相关数据,并通过建立合理的数学模型寻求最优博弈决策。 第五部分,结语。一方面本部分将对全文思想概要进行阐述,并得出中心结论,给出合理建议；另一方面,对我国房地产市场的发展形势进行展望。
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is a complex system, which is related to the national economy and the people's livelihood. It is one of the two "locomotives" in the economic development of our country, which has always been a major hot issue of the people's livelihood of the whole society. The overheating of the real estate market in China in recent years can be the result of various forces and interest group games: the high centralization of the central government and the excessive marketization of the real estate industry. Local governments pursue the short-term benefits and the difficulties of coordination among different departments, the real estate developers pursue the nature of high profits and their tacit monopoly behavior, as well as the speculative psychology of consumers and the reverse expectations of regulatory policies and so on. Based on the above facts, this paper makes use of the game theory to study the decision making and the equilibrium problem of the decision when the behavior of the game agent is directly interacting, and transforms the behavior theory of each subject in the real estate market into several typical game models. The rational equilibrium solutions of each game are obtained, and the realistic economic significance of these equilibrium solutions is interpreted, and the corresponding conclusions are obtained. In order to provide reference for the future real estate market, make its healthy and long-term development. This paper is divided into five parts, the main content is as follows: the first part, introduction. This part mainly introduces the research methods and significance of this paper, and summarizes the main behavior characteristics in the game of real estate market in China. Finally, the emergence and development of game theory are briefly introduced. The second part, the basic elements of real estate game. This part is the element analysis in the real estate market game, the third part focuses on the game characteristic analysis of the subject and the object, the concrete game analysis. This is the focus of this paper, also is the theoretical part of the argument, combined with the relevant policies to carry out theoretical analysis of various games; part four, the actual case study. In this part, based on the third part, the relevant data are introduced, and the optimal game decision is obtained by establishing a reasonable mathematical model. The fifth part, conclusion. On the one hand, this part will elaborate the whole text thought outline, and draw the central conclusion, give the reasonable suggestion; on the other hand, carry on the prospect to the development situation of the real estate market of our country.
【学位授予单位】：山西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32
本文编号：2187361
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is a complex system, which is related to the national economy and the people's livelihood. It is one of the two "locomotives" in the economic development of our country, which has always been a major hot issue of the people's livelihood of the whole society. The overheating of the real estate market in China in recent years can be the result of various forces and interest group games: the high centralization of the central government and the excessive marketization of the real estate industry. Local governments pursue the short-term benefits and the difficulties of coordination among different departments, the real estate developers pursue the nature of high profits and their tacit monopoly behavior, as well as the speculative psychology of consumers and the reverse expectations of regulatory policies and so on. Based on the above facts, this paper makes use of the game theory to study the decision making and the equilibrium problem of the decision when the behavior of the game agent is directly interacting, and transforms the behavior theory of each subject in the real estate market into several typical game models. The rational equilibrium solutions of each game are obtained, and the realistic economic significance of these equilibrium solutions is interpreted, and the corresponding conclusions are obtained. In order to provide reference for the future real estate market, make its healthy and long-term development. This paper is divided into five parts, the main content is as follows: the first part, introduction. This part mainly introduces the research methods and significance of this paper, and summarizes the main behavior characteristics in the game of real estate market in China. Finally, the emergence and development of game theory are briefly introduced. The second part, the basic elements of real estate game. This part is the element analysis in the real estate market game, the third part focuses on the game characteristic analysis of the subject and the object, the concrete game analysis. This is the focus of this paper, also is the theoretical part of the argument, combined with the relevant policies to carry out theoretical analysis of various games; part four, the actual case study. In this part, based on the third part, the relevant data are introduced, and the optimal game decision is obtained by establishing a reasonable mathematical model. The fifth part, conclusion. On the one hand, this part will elaborate the whole text thought outline, and draw the central conclusion, give the reasonable suggestion; on the other hand, carry on the prospect to the development situation of the real estate market of our country.
【学位授予单位】：山西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32
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